Secret and reliable communication presents a challenge involving a double dilemma for a user and an adversary. One challenge for the adversary is to decide between jamming and eavesdropping. While jamming can be quite effective in preventing reliable communication of the user, it can also be quite harmful for the adversary since he/she can be detected. On the other hand, eavesdropping is quite safe for the adversary; however, it sometimes may not be so efficient compared to jamming, if the adversary cannot respond to the information gleaned from eavesdropping in a timely manner. The user can either transmit, thus becoming vulnerable to malicious activity, or be in a silent mode in turn delaying his/her transmission. However, by combining these modes properly the user can assist an intruder detection system in detecting the adversary, since transmission can provoke the adversary into a jamming attack, and a strategically allocated silent mode while the jammer continues jamming can increase the probability of detecting the adversary. In this paper, to get insight into this problem, two simple stochastic games are proposed. Explicit solutions are found that lead to the characterization of some interesting properties. In particular, it is shown that under certain conditions, incorporating in the transmission protocol a time slot dealing just with the detection of malicious threats can improve the secrecy and reliability of the communication without extra transmission delay.
1 December 2014 in European Journal of Operational Research
Network security against possible attacks involves making decisions under uncertainty. Not only may one be ignorant of the place, the power, or the time of potential attacks, one may also be largely ignorant of the attacker's purpose. To illustrate this phenomenon, this paper proposes a simple Bayesian game-theoretic model of allocating defensive (scanning) effort among nodes of a network in which a network's defender does not know the adversary's motivation for intruding on the network, e.g., to bring the maximal damage to the network (for example, to steal credit card numbers or information on bank accounts stored there) or to infiltrate the network for other purposes (for example, to corrupt nodes for a further distributed denial of service botnet attack on servers). Due to limited defensive capabilities, the defender faces the dilemma of either: 1) focusing on increasing defense of the most valuable nodes, and in turn, increasing the chance for the adversary to sneak into the network through less valuable nodes or 2) taking care of defense of all the nodes, and in turn, reducing the level of defense of the most valuable ones. An explicit solution to this dilemma is suggested based on the information available to the defender, and it is shown how this information allows the authorities to increase the efficiency of a network's defense. Some interesting properties of the rivals' strategies are presented. Notably, the adversary's strategy has a node-sharing structure and the adversary's payoffs have a discontinuous dependence on the probability of the attack's type. This discontinuity implies that the defender has to take into account the human factor since some threshold values of this inclination in the adversary's behavior could make the defender's policy very sensitive to small perturbations, while in other situations it produces minimal impact.