Purpose: Companies affected by California’s cap-and-trade legislation are allotted certain credits for production that can be used or sold and can purchase additional credits from the state, which become a revenue source to be used for activities that reduce carbon emissions. The purpose of this paper is to investigate who ultimately pays for this program, its effectiveness in reducing carbon emissions in accordance with established goals, and the related effectiveness to advance social, economic, and environmental equity.Design/methodology/approach: The methodology used for this research is secondary data analysis, triangulating three sources: California’s Climate Change Investment Reports, 2019-2021; repositories maintained by the California High-Speed Rail Authority and the California Air Resources Board; and a review of the literature and websites from other professional sources which addressed, directly and indirectly, the topics and questions explored in the study.Findings: Key findings include evidence of enhancing social and environmental equity but ineffectiveness in reducing carbon emissions in accordance with state goals. Furthermore, the program displays evidence of economic inequity as it demonstrates characteristics of regressive taxation and an inability of low-income persons to acquire electric vehicles due to high costs.Originality/value: The research effort is unique in that no other academic efforts were located which attempt to examine the cap-and-trade program’s effectiveness in attaining its goals.
This study focuses on issues, possibilities, and challenges surrounding California’s net zero-emission mandate (the Mandate) for all new vehicle sales by 2035. Research methodology involved secondary data analysis of government and automobile industry websites coupled with a literature review, leading to new, original data analyses, with projection models generated by these authors. Considering normal annual new vehicle sales in California of roughly 1.8 million per year for all fuel types, based on data from 2018 to 2024, converting to the Mandate of EV sales only by 2035 indicates only 450,000 annual sales of new EVs by that time per these authors’ projections. This assumes consumers who normally buy a new gasoline-powered or hybrid vehicle convert to purchasing a new EV. Other challenges include insufficient lower-income household demand for EVs, inadequate purchase subsidies, a predictable lack of charging stations, and no evidence of a strategy for enforcing compliance with the Mandate.
California’s 2035 Electric Vehicle Mandate essentially required that all new vehicle sales must be all-electric. Subsidy funding from California for consumers was generally limited and came from cap-and-trade revenue allocations. California’s process is what business management scholars characterize as a “Push” strategy. For California this manifested as: 1.) put even more taxes or cap-and-trade revenue dollars against the effort and, 2.) “push” even more with legislated mandates. The lingering overarching questions continuing to this day consider if this approach is working and, if not, should another approach be considered? The authors’ intent is to project in the simplest terms whether California’s current path will meet their stated goals. As a natural extension of this analysis, California’s “Push” strategy will likely not achieve the success, and should they consider another management strategy? Evidence was gathered, as much as practicable, using the state of California’s own data and other sources related to consumer buying habits for the various demographic consumer groups identified. Simple projections made in Excel over the mandates time-period, ending in 2035, looked to see what the economic implications would be for the various demographic groups and how that would logically affect their participation and therefore mandate goals’ success. The main findings strongly suggest that the lower economic demographic that makes up approximately 40% of the population have been and will continue to be resistant to participate in EV purchases. In addition, insufficient infrastructure (i.e. enough chargers and in the right locations) is an impediment to all demographic groups. The costs to meet the mandate both practically and economically are too high for California to get the participation rates needed to meet its’ mandate goals. The “Push” management strategy employed by California is not likely to result in mandate goals being met. The authors believe California should pivot to a “Pull” management strategy which addresses the political, cultural, scientific, economic, and industrial concerns of all demographic groups.