Current evidence describing antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in the context of the Syrian conflict is of poor quality and sparse in nature. This paper explores and reports the major drivers of AMR that were present in Syria pre-conflict and those that have emerged since its onset in March 2011. Drivers that existed before the conflict included a lack of enforcement of existing legislation to regulate over-the-counter antibiotics and notification of communicable diseases. This contributed to a number of drivers of AMR after the onset of conflict, and these were also compounded by the exodus of trained staff, the increase in overcrowding and unsanitary conditions, the increase in injuries, and economic sanctions limiting the availability of required laboratory medical materials and equipment. Addressing AMR in this context requires pragmatic, multifaceted action at the local, regional, and international levels to detect and manage potentially high rates of multidrug-resistant infections. Priorities are (1) the development of a competent surveillance system for hospital-acquired infections, (2) antimicrobial stewardship, and (3) the creation of cost-effective and implementable infection control policies. However, it is only by addressing the conflict and immediate cessation of the targeting of health facilities that the rehabilitation of the health system, which is key to addressing AMR in this context, can progress.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in populations experiencing war has yet to be addressed, despite the abundance of contemporary conflicts and the protracted nature of twenty-first century wars, in combination with growing global concern over conflict-associated bacterial pathogens. The example of the Syrian conflict is used to explore the feasibility of using existing global policies on AMR in conditions of extreme conflict. The available literature on AMR and prescribing behaviour in Syria before and since the onset of the conflict in March 2011 was identified. Overall, there is a paucity of rigorous data before and since the onset of conflict in Syria to contextualize the burden of AMR. However, post onset of the conflict, an increasing number of studies conducted in neighbouring countries and Europe have reported AMR in Syrian refugees. High rates of multidrug resistance, particularly Gram-negative organisms, have been noted amongst Syrian refugees when compared with local populations. Conflict impedes many of the safeguards against AMR, creates new drivers, and exacerbates existing ones. Given the apparently high rates of AMR in Syria, in neighbouring countries hosting refugees, and in European countries providing asylum, this requires the World Health Organization and other global health institutions to address the causes, costs, and future considerations of conflict-related AMR as an issue of global governance.

Syria's protracted conflict has resulted in ideal conditions for the transmission of tuberculosis (TB) and the cultivation of drug-resistant strains. This paper compares TB control in Syria before and after the conflict using available data, examines the barriers posed by protracted conflict and those specific to Syria, and discusses what measures can be taken to address the control of TB in Syria. Forced mass displacement and systematic violations of humanitarian law have resulted in overcrowding and the destruction of key infrastructure, leading to an increased risk of both drug-sensitive and resistant TB, while restricting the ability to diagnose, trace contacts, treat, and follow-up. Pre-conflict, TB in Syria was officially reported at 22 per 100 000 population; the official figure for 2017 of 19 per 100 000 is likely a vast underestimate given the challenges and barriers to case detection. Limited diagnostics also affect the diagnosis of multidrug- and rifampicin-resistant TB, reported as comprising 8.8% of new diagnoses in 2017. The control of TB in Syria requires a multipronged, tailored, and pragmatic approach to improve timely diagnosis, increase detection, stop transmission, and mitigate the risk of drug resistance. Solutions must also consider vulnerable populations such as imprisoned and besieged communities where the risk of drug resistance is particularly high, and must recognize the limitations of national programming. Strengthening capacity to control TB in Syria with particular attention to these factors will positively impact other parallel conditions; this is key as attention turns to post-conflict reconstruction.

By late 2012 the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) had nearly eradicated this ancient infectious disease. Successful surveillance programs for acute flaccid paralysis however rely on broad governmental support for implementation. With the onset of conflict, public health breakdown has contributed to the resurgence of polio in a number of regions. The current laboratory based case definition may be a contributory factor in these regions. We sought to compare case definition rates using strict laboratory based criteria to rates obtained using the clinical criteria in modern day Syria. We also sought to examine this distribution of cases by sub-region. We examined the World Health Organization (WHO) reported figures for Syria from 2013-2014 using laboratory based criteria. We compared these with cases obtained when clinical criteria were applied. In addition we sought data from the opposition controlled Assistance Coordination Unit which operates in non-Government controlled areas where WHO data maybe incomplete. Cases were carefully examined for potential overlap to avoid double reporting. Whilst the WHO data clearly confirmed the polio outbreak in Syria, it did so with considerable delay and with under reporting of cases, particularly from non-government controlled areas. In addition, laboratory based case definition led to a substantial underestimate of polio (36 cases) compared with those found with the clinically compatible definition (an additional 46 cases). Rates of adequate diagnostic specimens from suspected cases are well below target, no doubt reflecting the effect of conflict in these areas. We have identified a gap in the surveillance of polio, a global threat. The current laboratory based definition, in the setting of conflict and insecurity, leads to under diagnosis of polio with potential delays and inadequacies in coordinating effective responses to contain outbreaks and eradicate polio. Breakdown in public health measures as a contributing factor is likely to result in a resurgence of previously controlled infectious diseases. The clinical definition should be reinstituted to supplement the lab-based definition.

Pandemics of infectious disease and growing anti-microbial resistance (AMR) pose major threats to global health, trade, and security. Conflict and climate change compound and accelerate these threats. The One Health approach recognizes the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health, but is grounded in the biomedical model, which reduces health to the absence of disease. Biomedical responses are insufficient to meet the challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic is the most recent example of the failure of this biomedical model to address global threats, the limitations of laboratory-based surveillance, and the exclusive focus on vaccination for disease control. This paper examines the current paradigm through the lens of polio and the global campaign to eradicate it, as well as other infectious threats including mpox and drug-resistant tuberculosis, particularly in the context of armed conflict. Decades before vaccines became widely available, public health measures—ventilation, chlorination, nutrition and sanitation— led to longer, healthier, and even taller lives. Chlorine, our primary tool of public health, conquered cholera and transformed infection control in hospitals. The World Health Organization (WHO), part of the One Health alliance, focuses mainly on antibiotics and vaccines to reduce deaths due to superbugs and largely ignores the critical role of chlorine to control water-borne diseases (including polio) and other infections. Moreover, the One Health approach ignores armed conflict. Contemporary wars are characterized by indiscriminate bombing of civilians, attacks targeting healthcare, mass displacement and lack of humanitarian access, conditions which drive polio outbreaks and incubate superbugs. We discuss the growing trend of attacks on healthcare and differentiate between types: community-driven attacks targeting vaccinators in regions like Pakistan, and state-sponsored attacks by governments such as those of Syria and Russia that weaponize healthcare to deliberately harm whole populations. Both fuel outbreaks of disease. These distinct motivations necessitate tailored responses, yet the WHO aggregates these attacks in a manner that hampers effective intervention. While antimicrobial resistance is predictable, the escalating pandemic is the consequence of our reliance on antibiotics and commitment to a biomedical model that now borders on pathological. Our analysis reveals the international indenture to the biomedical model as the basis of disease control is the root driver of AMR and vaccine-derived polio. The unique power of vaccines is reduced by vaccination-only strategy, and in fact breeds vaccine-derived polio. The non-specific effects of vaccines must be leveraged, and universal vaccination must be supplemented by international investment in water chlorination. This will reduce health costs and strengthen global health security. While vaccines are an important weapon to combat pandemics and AMR, they must be accompanied by the entire arsenal of public health interventions.