Aram Kim

Prof. Aram Kim

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 April 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AKAram Kim
Aram Kim
JOJunhyoung Oh
Junhyoung Oh
JRJinho Ryu
Jinho Ryu
Kyungho LeeKyungho Lee
Kyungho Lee
Security professionals, government agencies, and corporate organizations have found an inherent need to prevent or mitigate attacks from insider threats. Accordingly, active research on insider threat detection has been conducted to prevent and mitigate adverse effects such as leakage of valuable information that may be caused by insiders. Along with the growth of Internet-of-Things (IoT), new security challenges arise in the existing security frameworks. Attack surfaces are significantly enlarged which could cause a severe risk in terms of company insider threat management. In this work, we provide a generalization of aspects of insider threats with IoT and analyze the surveyed literature based on both private and public sources. We then examine data sources considering IoT environments based on the characteristics and the structure of IoT (perceptual, network, and application layers). The result of reviewing the study shows that using the data source of the network and application layer is more suitable than the perceptual layer in the IoT environment. We also categorized each layer’s data sources according to their features, and we investigated research objectives and methods for each category. Finally, the potential for utilization and limitations under the IoT environment are presented at the end of each layer examination.

12 November 2024 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ACAbhishek Chaudhary
Abhishek Chaudhary
JHJunseo Han
Junseo Han
SKSeongah Kim
Seongah Kim
AKAram Kim
Aram Kim
SCSunoh Choi
Sunoh Choi
Industries are increasingly adopting digital systems to improve control and accessibility by providing real-time monitoring and early alerts for potential issues. While digital transformation fuels exponential growth, it exposes these industries to cyberattacks. For critical sectors such as nuclear power plants, a cyberattack not only risks damaging the facility but also endangers human lives. In today’s digital world, enormous amounts of data are generated, and the analysis of these data can help ensure effectiveness, including security. In this study, we analyzed the data using a deep learning model for early detection of abnormal behavior. We first examined the Asherah Nuclear Power Plant simulator by initiating three different cyberattacks, each targeting a different system, thereby collecting and analyzing data from the simulator. Second, a Bi-LSTM model was used to detect anomalies in the simulator, which detected it before the plant’s protection system was activated in response to a threat. Finally, we applied explainable AI (XAI) to acquire insight into how distinctive features contribute to the detection of anomalies. XAI provides valuable explanations of model behavior by revealing how specific features influence anomaly detection during attacks. This research proposes an effective anomaly detection technique and interpretability to better understand counter-cyber threats in critical industries, such as nuclear plants.

22 June 2022 in Security and Communication Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AKAram Kim
Aram Kim
JOJunhyoung Oh
Junhyoung Oh
KKKookheui Kwon
Kookheui Kwon
Kyungho LeeKyungho Lee
Kyungho Lee
The development of information and communication technologies extended the application of digitalized industrial control systems (ICSs) to critical infrastructure. With this circumstance, emerging sophisticated cyberattacks by adversaries, including nation-backed terrorists, target ICSs due to their strategic value that critical infrastructure can cause severe consequences to equipment, people, and the environment due to the cyberattacks on ICSs. Therefore, critical infrastructure owners should provide high assurance to those involved, such as neighboring residents and governments, that the facility is adequately protected against cyberattacks. The risk assessment that identifies, estimates, and prioritizes risks is vital to provide high assurance. This study proposes a framework for evaluating risks by quantifying the likelihood of cyber exploitation and the consequences of cyberattacks. The quantification of the likelihood of cyber exploitation is inspired by research on Bayesian attack graphs (BAGs), allowing probability evaluation that considers the causal relationship between ICSs and multistage attacks. For the cyberattack consequences quantification, we propose a methodology to evaluate how far an impact will spread and thus how many functions will be influenced when an ICS is exploited. The methodology is conducted by ICS experts identifying and listing functional dependencies and essential function goals among ICSs that they are already familiar with and do not require in-depth cybersecurity knowledge. Through experiments, we demonstrated how to apply our framework to assess the risks of the plant protection system, which is a safety-grade digital system used in nuclear power plants. The result shows that risk can be multidimensionally assessed than previous literature, such as discovering that components that were not considered important have high risk due to their functional connectivity.

9 January 2025 in Progress in Nuclear Energy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KNKihaeng Nam
Kihaeng Nam
KKKookheui Kwon
Kookheui Kwon
AKAram Kim
Aram Kim

25 August 2026 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SJSanghoon Jeon
Sanghoon Jeon
AKAram Kim
Aram Kim
Network intrusion detectors degrade when operational traffic diverges from their training domain, yet unconditional retraining wastes scarce labeling effort. Using CIC-IDS2017 and CSE-CIC-IDS2018 as source and target domains, with the target replayed chronologically, we report two findings. First, degradation is heterogeneous: some classifier–shift pairs recover through threshold recalibration alone, so severity cannot be inferred from distributional change. Second, where behavioral diversity accumulates gradually, a fixed budget of exact-duplicate groups (EDGs) recovers the detector when drawn from the whole target period, and it fails when drawn from the first hours whether in arrival order or at random. We call this effect arrival bias. We propose a label-efficient framework that escalates through threshold recalibration, buffered few-shot source–target retraining, and full target-domain retraining. Time-ordered cross-validation sets the label budget and collection horizon, and a diversity precondition withholds deployment when validation cannot certify a candidate. Across 7 attack classes, 4 classifiers, and 10 group-aware partitions, the policy meets the operational recall target in 24 of 28 attack–classifier combinations, against 9 for recalibration alone, 8 for online active learning even with unrestricted pool access, and 0 for CORAL. Nineteen combinations select an identical level in all ten partitions. The required level is strongly classifier-dependent, not a property of the shift alone.