The Internet of Things (IoT) is reshaping our connected world as the number of lightweight devices connected to the Internet is rapidly growing. Therefore, high-quality research on intrusion detection in the IoT domain is essential. To this end, network intrusion data sets are fundamental, as many attack detection strategies have to be trained and evaluated using such data sets. In this article, we introduce the description, statistical analysis, and machine learning evaluation of the novel ToN_IoT data set. A comparison to other recent IoT data sets shows the importance of heterogeneity within these data sets, and how differences between data sets may have a huge impact on detection performance. In a cross-training experiment, we show that the inclusion of different data collection methods and a large diversity of the monitored features are of crucial importance for IoT network intrusion data sets to be useful for the industry. We also explain that the practical application of IoT data sets in operational environments requires the standardization of feature descriptions and cyberattack classes. This can only be achieved with a joint effort from the research community.
Much value in a brownfield Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) implementation resides at its edge tier, where new types of devices and technologies are deployed to interoperate the legacy industrial control systems with servers and systems in the cloud, and leverage the benefits of the IoT technologies. One of these novel devices is the IIoT edge gateway, which is used to connect critical physical systems with the cyber world, and to provide consistent storage, processing, analytical and controlling capabilities. However, these devices also come with new and advanced threats such as targeted ransomware. In this paper, we investigate this threat in detail. We studied the threat actors’ motivations, the anatomy of ransomware for edge gateways, and the likelihood of such ransomware attack to happen in the future. We found that threat actors find IIoT edge gateways attractive ransomware targets due to their vital roles and functionalities in working with critical infrastructure and that the likelihood of such attack to occur is high. We built the first version of a ransomware security testbed for IIoT, and for test purposes, we developed a first version of ransomware target at IIoT edge gateway in a brownfield system. From our measurements we conclude that kernel-related activity parameters are significant indicators of the abnormal behavior caused by crypto-ransomware attacks in IIoT edge gateways, much more so even than for similar attacks in IT server workstation. Thereby, some potential countermeasures for addressing targeted ransomware in IIoT systems are recommended as proactive strategies for dealing with attackers’ new techniques and tactics.
1 January 1996 in The Journal of Physical Chemistry