Current literature on relationship management has focused on formal mechanisms such as contracts but has neglected the inter-organizational behavior that determines the effective adoption of relational mechanisms in the context of megaprojects. This study examines the antecedents and consequences of relational behavior of participating organizations in megaprojects based on the theory of planned behavior (TPB). A sample of 285 senior managers working on China’s megaprojects was surveyed, and the results were analyzed using partial least square structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM), revealing that: (1) the adoption of relational behavior is equally motivated by an organization’s behavioral intention and perceived behavioral control (PBC), and (2) relational behavior, especially information exchange, contributes the most toward achieving a high project relationship quality. A closer examination of the data found that two moderating effects, namely project culture and prior experience with other participating organizations, were particularly important. These findings contributed to four implications for project participating organizations to cultivate relational behavior and improve relationship quality in megaprojects, including identifying potential behavioral benefits, enhancing relational competence, establishing collaborative culture, and reinforcing information sharing.

While the governance of Western megaprojects is indirectly influenced by governments through legislation and regulations, the Chinese state actively oversees and controls projects of societal importance. To provide clarity on the role of the state in Chinese megaprojects, we carried out a case study focusing on EXPO 2010 Shanghai. Our analysis revealed that through a project-specific organization Construction Headquarter (CHQ), the Chinese state executes administrative strength, forces authorities to temporarily integrate their processes for the benefit of the project, influences contractor and resource selection decisions, induces leadership accountability, and promotes shared project values.

The transition from projects to operations requires a spanning from more temporary, goal‐oriented, and evolving organizational forms to more permanent, routine, and ongoing organizational forms. A question of practical and theoretical significance is how to organize the transition to operations in large inter‐organizational projects. To answer this question, we conducted a longitudinal case study of Beijing Daxing International Airport, which is the largest transportation hub in China to date, and provides rich evidence for successfully managing the transition to operations. By analyzing the organizational design strategy, structures, processes, and management of people in the transition, we provide a synthetic framework for designing the transition to operations in large inter‐organizational projects. The framework provides a set of considerations to design organizational boundaries that build connections, emphasize coordination, and achieve continuity between projects and operations. This study contributes to the nexus of operations management and project management and the organizational design of large inter‐organizational projects.

Supplier development (SD) has become an emerging supply chain management practice for firms focusing on their core strategic advantages by outsourcing a significant portion of production or construction activities. Various incentive mechanisms are available for suppliers to improve their capabilities to meet owners’ expectations. However, a comparative analysis is needed to understand how successful they are. This paper investigates the incentive mechanisms for SD in a construction supply chain that consists of one owner and one supplier. Considering the owner's dominant position in the negotiation of a supply contract, a principal–agent model with the objective of optimizing the owner's profit and a Stackelberg game model designed to optimize the profits of both the owner and supplier are proposed and analyzed. Two commonly used incentive methods, including purchase price incentive and cost sharing, are analyzed and compared. The analysis and comparison are illustrated by a numerical example. The primary contribution of this paper is the analysis of the impact of incentive methods on quality improvement for the supplier and a sensitivity analysis of the supplier's internal and external factors, such as purchase quantity, market demand, and manufacturing cost structures, which are useful managerial insights for SD practices in mega construction projects.

In emerging economies, infrastructure projects are in full swing. There is a wealth of replicable experience for exploitation. Simultaneously, more technologies and methodologies require further exploration. This makes fostering ambidextrous innovation strategies (i.e., the tradeoff between exploitative and exploratory innovation strategies) a common and vital practical issue. Large infrastructure projects are unique one-off endeavors but have somewhat repetitive and persistent characteristics. It is a particular “intermediate” form between temporary projects and permanent organizations. Previous research on fostering ambidextrous innovation strategies cannot simply be replicated in large infrastructure projects. To address this issue, this article investigates the relationship between team heterogeneity and ambidextrous innovation strategies and also the role of team learning and identification in large infrastructure projects. Data were collected from 269 responses from 31 large infrastructure project delivery teams in China. The findings show that team heterogeneity has a positive linear effect on exploratory and ambidextrous innovation strategies and an inverted U-shaped effect on exploitative innovation strategies; team heterogeneity can better foster ambidextrous innovation strategies through improving team learning; the moderating role of team identification in the overall mechanism differs from the usual assumptions in permanent organizations. Overall, this article extends the existing ambidexterity research in the “intermediate” form between temporary projects and permanent organizations. It provides insights and guidance on fostering ambidextrous innovation strategies in large infrastructure projects.