We examine the relationship between audit quality and office-level auditor turnover. Using resumes of over 106,000 Big 4 auditors, we find that audit offices with higher turnover have a greater likelihood of client annual report restatements. This detrimental effect is more pronounced when the departing auditors are more experienced and when the office faces tighter human capital constraints and is primarily attributable to voluntary turnover. Further, such negative effect is borne mostly by complex clients and intangible-intensive clients but is weakened for clients with greater product similarity to the client portfolio of the audit office. Last, the impact of office-level turnover on audit quality persists after controlling for firm-level turnover. Our findings inform the current policy debate on whether and to what extent audit firms should disclose auditor turnover as a potential indicator of audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42.
19 February 2021 in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
SUMMARY: We document that non-income-increasing (NII) misreporting is important to investors and then investigate whether auditors respond to and prevent different types of NII misstatements. We categorize NII misstatements into those whose correction adversely (i.e., unfavorably) affect financial reports and those whose correction positively (i.e., favorably) affect financial reports. We find that audit fees are positively associated with unfavorable NII misstatements, but not with favorable NII misstatements. We examine whether auditors prevent quarterly misstatements from resulting in annual report misstatements and find that auditors are less likely to prevent both favorable and unfavorable NII quarterly report misstatements from resulting in annual report misstatements, with the audit efficacy being lower for favorable NII misstatements. In sum, our research indicates that auditors do attempt to constrain NII misreporting with greater effort expended on unfavorable NII misstatements. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources. JEL Classifications: M49.
22 November 2019 in Contemporary Accounting Research
Fair value estimates from external third-party sources are generally considered more reliable than internal estimates based on managerial inputs. However, even externally sourced estimates are subject to managerial opportunism, because firms can switch from one external source to another. In the context of life insurance companies that mostly rely on external sources, we posit that such source switches could be driven by managerial incentive either to faithfully report fair values (objective valuation) or to inflate estimates to avoid OTTI (opinion shopping). Our results support both motives. In instances in which the two incentives yield conflicting predictions for source switching, we find the opinion-shopping motive dominates. We also find that switches that increase fair value estimates are associated with a reduced OTTI likelihood and magnitude, especially for high-impairment-risk securities. On balance, our evidence suggests that opportunism with respect to source switching can compromise the reliability of externally sourced fair value estimates. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G22; M41.
16 July 2024 in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
SUMMARY: Prior research provides some evidence that strict corporate monitoring constrains financial misreporting. We examine whether the efficacy of various corporate monitoring mechanisms hinges on the nature of accounting standards—rules-based standards (RBS) versus principles-based standards (PBS)—in place. We generally document that the negative association between the likelihood of misstatements and tough monitoring by audit committees, boards, external auditors, and the SEC is more pronounced under RBS than under PBS. This evidence collectively suggests that most corporate gatekeepers fulfill their monitoring obligations primarily through ensuring better compliance with detailed standards when the applicable standards are more specific and leave less room for discretion. Although some prior studies document higher financial reporting quality under PBS, our results imply that it is important for regulators to also consider the potentially higher monitoring efficacy under RBS when setting accounting standards. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M42.