David Fuller

David Fuller


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 October 2021 in European Economic Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SAStéphane Auray
Stéphane Auray
DFDavid Fuller
David Fuller
GVGuillaume Vandenbroucke
Guillaume Vandenbroucke

1 February 2018 in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RBRobert Baumann
Robert Baumann
BEBryan Eldon Engelhardt
Bryan Eldon Engelhardt
DFDavid Fuller
David Fuller

7 February 2023 in HAL
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Preprint
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PDF file
SAStéphane Auray
Stéphane Auray
DFDavid Fuller
David Fuller
NLNicolas Lepage-Saucier
Nicolas Lepage-Saucier
We examine the optimal provision of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in a directed search model with matching frictions. Workers have differing levels of liquidity to smooth consumption during an unemployment spell. The model allows workers to choose between paying a fixed cost to collect the government provided UI benefits, or to forgo this scheme. Noncollectors do not receive liquid UI benefits, but do experience a shorter expected unemployment duration. Using data from the SIPP and a Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) model, weestimate jointly the decision to collect UI benefits and the risk of going back to work, which yields several novel results with policy implications. Households with lower liquidity are less likely to opt into the government UI scheme, as the need to find a job quickly outweighs the shortlived liquidity provided by UI benefits. The MPH estimation also finds that collecting benefits significantly lengthens the duration of unemployment: UI receipt decreases the probability of finding a job by 40%. The model is calibrated to the empirical results. The optimal policy in the calibrated economy features a relatively high replacement rate and short potential duration.