Samir Abood

Dr. Samir Abood


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 January 2025 in Machines
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SASamir Abood
Samir Abood
AAAnnamalai Annamalai
Annamalai Annamalai
MCMohamed Chouikha
Mohamed Chouikha
TNTurk Nejress
Turk Nejress
Electrical motors and drives are the unseen forces driving our modern world, powering everything from electric vehicles to industrial machinery. The efficiency, precision, and sustainability of these systems are very important. Unexpected motor failures can cause major disruptions, risk human lives, and cause costly downtime. This research aims to improve the efficiency and performance of three-phase synchronous machines using Artificial Intelligence (AI) strategies. The research uses real-time data and optimization techniques to explore advanced diagnostic techniques, fault diagnosis, fault tolerance, and condition monitoring schemes to enhance safety, reliability, and performance in electric synchronous operations. Experimental results demonstrated that AI-driven methods achieve higher fault detection accuracy than traditional techniques. The findings highlight the potential of AI in improving the reliability of industrial synchronous motors.

30 November 2024 in Journal of Internet Services and Information Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZAZainab Ibrahim Abood Al-Rifaee
Zainab Ibrahim Abood Al-Rifaee
TITarik Z. Ismaeel
Tarik Z. Ismaeel
SASamir Abood
Samir Abood
Fingerprints remain consistent and stable throughout a human’s lifetime. This research exhibits the utilization of fingerprint bio-metrics to generate secured keys for improved security. The main contribution is the generation of 87 keys, achieved by enhancing the fingerprint image and sharpening it with a Laplacian filter. Three types of geometrical shapes chosen arbitrary, such as circle, square, and triangle, are separately drawn on the fingerprint after binarization, morphological operations, and thinning. Each shape is drawn five times on the fingerprint with different radii for each type to increase the number of keys. The end and bifurcation points are extracted as features inside and outside these shapes and these features are considered as keys. Chaotic-Pseudo-Random-Number Generator (CPRNG) technique is used, and the generated keys are merged with those generated from the positions of minutiae (end and bifurcation) points. The process was implemented using MATLAB R2021b. The simulation results demonstrate that it is difficult to crack the keys generated by this technique because the attacker requires a very long time, almost 7.5595e+159 years, to decrypt the encrypted message. Using geometrical shapes and CPRNG) technique increases the number of keys. The contribution of 87 keys is raising the time needed to break the encrypted text to this time, which is greater than the time required to crack the keys generated in some previous research compared to them. Therefore, the proposed technique enhances privacy and security. It can be used via deep learning in fingerprint identification, recognition, and key generation mechanisms and can use any other geometrical shapes.

19 January 2026 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SASamir Abood
Samir Abood
NINafisa Islam
Nafisa Islam
MCMohamed F. Chouikha
Mohamed F. Chouikha
AAAnnamalai Annamalai
Annamalai Annamalai
IKIslam Khalid
Islam Khalid
This study analyzes controllability and observability in cyber-physical smart grid systems under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. A practical real-time system based on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) technology was constructed to represent a three-bus smart grid. The Telnet protocol has been used to analyze the impact of the attacks on controllability and observability. Real-time cybersecurity strategies were applied to protect system components and restore their performance during the attack. The system was tested under three types of cyberattacks: a Telnet attack on port 23, a Flood attack over Modbus TCP, and an ICMP attack using hping3. The system was evaluated using controllability and observability matrices, and the theories were validated using practical simulations. The experiments were conducted on three different electrical networks: a three-bus network, a nine-bus network, and a fourteen-bus network to measure the system’s responsiveness. The results showed that cyberattacks significantly affected system stability; however, the implementation of cybersecurity protection mechanisms enabled the system to maintain controllability and observability during the attacks. This study proposes a framework for improving smart grid response to cyberattacks while maintaining controllability and observability. A realistic SCADA environment supported by packet analysis tools such as Wireshark was used to monitor system behavior during attacks. The results provide a new contribution to the research on protecting cyber-physical smart grid systems under practical attack conditions. Experimental and simulation results demonstrated that the proposed defensive control mechanisms effectively reduce rotational speed disturbances caused by cyberattacks on actuators by more than 80%. The system also proved capable of maintaining controllability and observability through full-rank matrices, even under coordinated attacks. Furthermore, real-time SCADA system experiments showed that the average system response time did not exceed 1.8 seconds, confirming the efficiency of the proposed framework in maintaining system stability under attack.

20 May 2026 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZEZachary Etinge
Zachary Etinge
AAAnnamalai Annamalai
Annamalai Annamalai
MCMohamed Chouikha
Mohamed Chouikha
SASamir Abood
Samir Abood
Ensuring resilient controllability and observability in SCADA-based smart grids under coordinated cyberattacks remains a critical and unresolved challenge in modern cyber-physical power systems. This paper investigates the impact of coordinated cyberattacks on the stability and monitoring capabilities of SCADA-based smart-grid systems within a controlled cyber-physical environment. An active cyber-physical testbed representing a multi-bus power system was created to analyze how attacks targeting communication channels affect controllability and observability. Several attack scenarios were implemented, including remote access attacks via Secure Shell (SSH), Modbus/TCP flooding, and ICMP-based attacks, to monitor their impact on control actions, communication reliability, and system responsiveness. To address these vulnerabilities, a SCADA-based cybersecurity monitoring system was implemented within the controlled testbed environment. The system analyzes SCADA operational logs from smart grid devices while packet-level network traffic is captured and examined using monitoring tools such as Wireshark. A central monitoring layer coordinates system-wide attack detection and response. System resilience was evaluated using controllability and observability matrix rank analysis, together with dynamic stability metrics during attack conditions. Experimental and simulation results show that coordinated cyberattacks significantly degrade system performance, with the average delay rising from 12 ms to 210 ms, the packet loss rate increasing to 15.5%, and the command execution error rate reaching 40%. Furthermore, the ranks of the controllability and observability matrices dropped from 4 to 2, indicating a critical partial loss of the system’s control and monitoring capabilities. In this work, the federated-learning-based component is explored as a distributed, privacy-preserving cybersecurity monitoring framework for anomaly detection and observability enhancement using SCADA-derived datasets, rather than as a fully integrated real-time SCADA operational control mechanism. At the same time, the attack’s impact on electrical properties remained limited to less than 2%.

2 October 2026 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SSSomayeh Soroush
Somayeh Soroush
SASamir Abood
Samir Abood
AAAnnamalai Annamalai
Annamalai Annamalai
MCMohamed Chouikha
Mohamed Chouikha
TNTurk Nejress
Turk Nejress
Power electronic systems are evolving from conventional fixed-function converters toward intelligent, adaptive, and cyber-physical energy-conversion platforms in which modulation, predictive control, artificial intelligence (AI), digital twins (DTs), fault diagnosis, and cybersecurity increasingly interact within a unified closed-loop architecture. This paper presents an integrated review and mathematical framework for next-generation modulation and control of power electronic systems, with an emphasis on advanced modulation, predictive control, AI-assisted adaptation, converter-oriented digital state estimation, fault-tolerant operation, and cyber-resilient control. The proposed framework links converter dynamics, state and parameter estimation, physical faults, cyber disturbances, supervisory anomaly assessment, and mode-dependent control reconfiguration. Two clearly separated validation levels complement the literature synthesis: experimentally measured operating data are used to establish physically representative operating conditions, whereas a dedicated converter-control model is used to evaluate closed-loop dynamic resilience. Under a combined physical/cyber disturbance, resilient reconfiguration reduced the post-event speed RMSE from 9.203 to 0.425 rad/s, the peak speed error from 29.999 to 1.724 rad/s, and the maximum current from 69.112 to 10.662 A, while eliminating 829 current-constraint violations observed without resilience. Across 100 randomized Monte Carlo trials, the mean post-event RMSE decreased from 11.951 ± 3.060 to 0.769 ± 0.291 rad/s, with the corresponding 95% confidence interval narrowing from 11.351–12.550 to 0.712–0.826 rad/s. The results provide simulation-based, closed-loop evidence that coordinated state estimation, anomaly assessment, and resilient reconfiguration can substantially limit disturbance propagation while maintaining converter-control performance under combined physical and cyber abnormalities. Hardware-in-the-loop and embedded real-time implementation remain subjects for future validation.

7 April 2026 in Preprints.org
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
ZEZachary Etinge
Zachary Etinge
AAAnnamalai Annamalai
Annamalai Annamalai
MCMohamed Chouikha
Mohamed Chouikha
SASamir Abood
Samir Abood
Ensuring resilient controllability and observability in SCADA-based smart grids under coordinated cyberattacks remains a critical and unresolved challenge in modern cyber-physical power systems. This paper demonstrates the impact of coordinated cyberattacks on the stability and monitoring capabilities of SCADA-based smart grid systems in a controlled cyber-physical environment. An active cyber-physical testbed representing a multi-bus power system was created to be able to analyze how attacks targeting communication channels affect controllability and observability. Several attack scenarios were implemented, including remote access attacks via Secure Shell (SSH), Modbus/TCP flooding, and ICMP-based attacks, to monitor their impact on control actions, measure accuracy, and assess system responsiveness. To address these vulnerabilities, a SCADA-based cybersecurity monitoring system was implemented within the controlled testbed environment. The system analyzes SCADA operational logs from smart grid devices while packet-level network traffic is captured and examined using monitoring tools such as Wireshark. A central monitoring layer coordinates system-wide attack detection and response. System resilience was evaluated using controllability and observability matrix rank analysis, together with dynamic stability metrics during attack conditions. Experimental and simulation results show that coordinated cyberattacks lead to a significant degradation in system performance, with the average delay rising from 12 ms to 210 ms, the packet loss rate increasing to 15.5%, and the command execution error rate reaching 40%. Furthermore, the ranks of the controllability and observability matrices dropped from 4 to 2, indicating a critical partial loss of the systemʹs control and monitoring capabilities. At the same time, the attackʹs impact on electrical properties remained limited to less than 2%.