Background: Contractual negotiations conducted by artificial intelligence (AI) systems raise profound legal challenges, most notably the question of allocating civil liability for damages caused by their errors. This study, employing a comparative analytical methodology, reveals a significant regulatory gap in Arab jurisdictions—particularly Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—where legislation lacks explicit provisions governing such liability. In contrast, recent European Union initiatives, including the risk-based approach of the AI Act and the emerging framework of the AI Liability Directive, place primary emphasis on the accountability of developers and operators. Against this backdrop, the paper advocates for the development of a specialised Arab legal framework that draws inspiration from comparative models while preserving local specificities. Such a framework should include: a precise legal definition of intelligent systems, concrete evidentiary mechanisms for fault attribution and liability distribution, the establishment of a dedicated supervisory authority, and the strengthening of insurance mechanisms as complementary safeguards. Methods: This study employs a comparative analytical method to examine civil liability for AI errors in contractual negotiations, focusing on tort and contractual theories under Egyptian and Emirati law, and contrasting them with recent EU developments—particularly the AI Liability Directive and the Data Act, which provide clearer guidance than the AI Act. Results and conclusions: The comparative analysis yields three main results. First, there is a clear regulatory gap in Arab jurisdictions, which continue to rely on general civil law provisions without specialised rules for AI. Second, doctrinal differences between strict liability in the EU and the broader remedial approach in Arab systems complicate any direct transposition of European models. Third, evidentiary challenges remain central in both systems, as establishing fault and causation in AI-related harm is inherently complex.
This research argues that Islamic jurisprudence already contains the rule that the European courts upheld, stunning that leaves the animal alive until the cut, and that the gap between the two traditions lies in enforcement rather than in doctrine. Both traditions permit killing for food. Both require humane treatment. Both accept stunning that leaves the animal alive until the cut. The real gap lies in enforcement, since some Muslim-majority states apply the formal conditions of dhabḥ while neglecting the conduct norms of iḥsān. The study combines doctrinal and comparative analysis with the study of institutions and of case law. It examines six Muslim-majority jurisdictions in two groups alongside the Belgian litigation before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia form the supervised group. Each administers reversible stunning through its own instrument. Indonesia relies on a fatwa and Malaysia on a production protocol. Turkey relies on an accreditation guideline. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Morocco form the permissive group. They permit conditional stunning in doctrine or standards while enforcing the surrounding conduct norms weakly. The UAE has the most complete standard of the three, and its remaining gap is coverage beyond licensed facilities. Egypt’s conditional acceptance of imported stunned meat exposes the asymmetry within the permissive position. The study concludes that the supervised model can be generalised in the Arab world through administrative channels such as certification and audit. This route requires no new doctrine and no political confrontation.