Steven Garty Fite Wassilak

Dr. Steven Garty Fite Wassilak

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2011 in The Journal of Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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SWSteven Garty Fite Wassilak
Steven Garty Fite Wassilak
MPMuhammad Ali Pate
Muhammad Ali Pate
KWKathleen Wannemuehler
Kathleen Wannemuehler
JJJulie Jenks
Julie Jenks
CBCara Burns
Cara Burns
OKOlen Kew
Olen Kew
(See the article by Nathanson et al., on pages 889–90 .) Wild poliovirus has remained endemic in northern Nigeria because of low coverage achieved in the routine immunization program and in supplementary immunization activities (SIAs). An outbreak of infection involving 315 cases of type 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2; >1% divergent from Sabin 2) occurred during July 2005–June 2010, a period when 23 of 34 SIAs used monovalent or bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) lacking Sabin 2. In addition, 21 “pre-VDPV2” (0.5%–1.0% divergent) cases occurred during this period. Both cVDPV and pre-VDPV cases were clinically indistinguishable from cases due to wild poliovirus. The monthly incidence of cases increased sharply in early 2009, as more children aged without trivalent OPV SIAs. Cumulative state incidence of pre-VDPV2/cVDPV2 was correlated with low childhood immunization against poliovirus type 2 assessed by various means. Strengthened routine immunization programs in countries with suboptimal coverage and balanced use of OPV formulations in SIAs are necessary to minimize risks of VDPV emergence and circulation.

24 September 2015 in BMC Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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RTRadboud J. Duintjer Tebbens
Radboud J. Duintjer Tebbens
MPMark A. Pallansch
Mark A. Pallansch
SCStephen L. Cochi
Stephen L. Cochi
SWSteven Garty Fite Wassilak
Steven Garty Fite Wassilak
Kimberly M ThompsonKimberly M Thompson
Kimberly M Thompson
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, but many questions remain related to long-term poliovirus risk management policies. We used an integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to simulate possible futures and estimate the health and economic outcomes of maintaining the 2013 status quo of continued OPV use in most developing countries compared with OPV cessation policies with various assumptions about global inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) adoption. Continued OPV use after global WPV eradication leads to continued high costs and/or high cases. Global OPV cessation comes with a high probability of at least one outbreak, which aggressive outbreak response can successfully control in most instances. A low but non-zero probability exists of uncontrolled outbreaks following a poliovirus reintroduction long after OPV cessation in a population in which IPV-alone cannot prevent poliovirus transmission. We estimate global incremental net benefits during 2013–2052 of approximately $16 billion (US$2013) for OPV cessation with at least one IPV routine immunization dose in all countries until 2024 compared to continued OPV use, although significant uncertainty remains associated with the frequency of exportations between populations and the implementation of long term risk management policies. Global OPV cessation offers the possibility of large future health and economic benefits compared to continued OPV use. Long-term poliovirus risk management interventions matter (e.g., IPV use duration, outbreak response, containment, continued surveillance, stockpile size and contents, vaccine production site requirements, potential antiviral drugs, and potential safer vaccines) and require careful consideration. Risk management activities can help to ensure a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks and preserve or further increase the positive net benefits of OPV cessation. Important uncertainties will require more research, including characterizing immunodeficient long-term poliovirus excretor risks, containment risks, and the kinetics of outbreaks and response in an unprecedented world without widespread live poliovirus exposure.

24 March 2016 in BMC Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
RTRadboud J. Duintjer Tebbens
Radboud J. Duintjer Tebbens
MPMark A. Pallansch
Mark A. Pallansch
SWSteven Garty Fite Wassilak
Steven Garty Fite Wassilak
SCStephen L. Cochi
Stephen L. Cochi
Kimberly M ThompsonKimberly M Thompson
Kimberly M Thompson
Following successful eradication of wild polioviruses and planned globally-coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), national and global health leaders may need to respond to outbreaks from reintroduced live polioviruses, particularly vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Preparing outbreak response plans and assessing potential vaccine needs from an emergency stockpile require consideration of the different national risks and conditions as they change with time after OPV cessation. We used an integrated global model to consider several key issues related to managing poliovirus risks and outbreak response, including the time interval during which monovalent OPV (mOPV) can be safely used following homotypic OPV cessation; the timing, quality, and quantity of rounds required to stop transmission; vaccine stockpile needs; and the impacts of vaccine choices and surveillance quality. We compare the base case scenario that assumes aggressive outbreak response and sufficient mOPV available from the stockpile for all outbreaks that occur in the model, with various scenarios that change the outbreak response strategies. Outbreak response after OPV cessation will require careful management, with some circumstances expected to require more and/or higher quality rounds to stop transmission than others. For outbreaks involving serotype 2, using trivalent OPV instead of mOPV2 following cessation of OPV serotype 2 but before cessation of OPV serotypes 1 and 3 would represent a good option if logistically feasible. Using mOPV for outbreak response can start new outbreaks if exported outside the outbreak population into populations with decreasing population immunity to transmission after OPV cessation, but failure to contain outbreaks resulting in exportation of the outbreak poliovirus may represent a greater risk. The possibility of mOPV use generating new long-term poliovirus excretors represents a real concern. Using the base case outbreak response assumptions, we expect over 25 % probability of a shortage of stockpiled filled mOPV vaccine, which could jeopardize the achievement of global polio eradication. For the long term, responding to any poliovirus reintroductions may require a global IPV stockpile. Despite the risks, our model suggests that good risk management and response strategies can successfully control most potential outbreaks after OPV cessation. Health leaders should carefully consider the numerous outbreak response choices that affect the probability of successfully managing poliovirus risks after OPV cessation.

18 February 2015 in BMC Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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DKDominika A Kalkowska
Dominika A Kalkowska
RTRadboud J Duintjer Tebbens
Radboud J Duintjer Tebbens
MPMark A Pallansch
Mark A Pallansch
SCStephen L Cochi
Stephen L Cochi
SWSteven Garty Fite Wassilak
Steven Garty Fite Wassilak
Kimberly M ThompsonKimberly M Thompson
Kimberly M Thompson
Most poliovirus infections occur with no symptoms and this leads to the possibility of silent circulation, which complicates the confirmation of global goals to permanently end poliovirus transmission. Previous simple models based on hypothetical populations assumed perfect detection of symptomatic cases and suggested the need to observe no paralytic cases from wild polioviruses (WPVs) for approximately 3-4 years to achieve 95% confidence about eradication, but the complexities in real populations and the imperfect nature of surveillance require consideration. We revisit the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation using a more comprehensive model that reflects the conditions in a number of places with different characteristics related to WPV transmission, and we model the actual environmental WPV detection that occurred in Israel in 2013. We consider the analogous potential for undetected transmission of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses. The model explicitly accounts for the impact of different vaccination activities before and after the last detected case of paralytic polio, different levels of surveillance, variability in transmissibility and neurovirulence among serotypes, and the possibility of asymptomatic participation in transmission by previously-vaccinated or infected individuals. We find that prolonged circulation in the absence of cases and thus undetectable by case-based surveillance may occur if vaccination keeps population immunity close to but not over the threshold required for the interruption of transmission, as may occur in northwestern Nigeria for serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus in the event of insufficient tOPV use. Participation of IPV-vaccinated individuals in asymptomatic fecal-oral transmission may also contribute to extended transmission undetectable by case-based surveillance, as occurred in Israel. We also find that gaps or quality issues in surveillance could significantly reduce confidence about actual disruption. Maintaining high population immunity and high-quality surveillance for several years after the last detected polio cases will remain critical elements of the polio end game. Countries will need to maintain vigilance in their surveillance for polioviruses and recognize that their risks of undetected circulation may differ as a function of their efforts to manage population immunity and to identify cases or circulating live polioviruses.

29 January 2014 in BMC Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
RTRadboud J Duintjer Tebbens
Radboud J Duintjer Tebbens
DKDominika A Kalkowska
Dominika A Kalkowska
SWSteven Garty Fite Wassilak
Steven Garty Fite Wassilak
MPMark A Pallansch
Mark A Pallansch
SCStephen L Cochi
Stephen L Cochi
Kimberly M ThompsonKimberly M Thompson
Kimberly M Thompson
Global efforts to eradicate wild polioviruses (WPVs) continue to face challenges due to uninterrupted endemic WPV transmission in three countries and importation-related outbreaks into previously polio-free countries. We explore the potential role of including older children and adults in supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) to more rapidly increase population immunity and prevent or stop transmission.

14 October 2014 in The Journal of Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SWSteven Garty Fite Wassilak
Steven Garty Fite Wassilak
MOM. Steven Oberste
M. Steven Oberste
RTRudolph H. Tangermann
Rudolph H. Tangermann
ODOusmane M. Diop
Ousmane M. Diop
HJHamid S. Jafari
Hamid S. Jafari
GAGregory L. Armstrong
Gregory L. Armstrong
Despite substantial progress, global polio eradication has remained elusive. Indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission in 4 endemic countries (Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan) persisted into 2010 and outbreaks from imported WPV continued. By 2013, most outbreaks in the interim were promptly controlled. The number of polio-affected districts globally has declined by 74% (from 481 in 2009 to 126 in 2013), including a 79% decrease in the number of affected districts in endemic countries (from 304 to 63). India is now polio-free. The challenges to success in the remaining polio-endemic countries include (1) threats to the security of vaccinators in each country and a ban on polio vaccination in areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan; (2) a risk of decreased government commitment; and (3) remaining surveillance gaps. Coordinated efforts under the International Health Regulations and efforts to mitigate the challenges provide a clear opportunity to soon secure global eradication.