In this paper, we consider a permutation flowshop scheduling problem with the total flow time as the schedule performance measure. A proactive-reactive approach is designed to simultaneously deal with stochastic disruptions (e.g., machine breakdowns) and dynamic events (e.g., newly arriving jobs and delay in job availability). In the proactive stage, the stochastic machine breakdown is hedged against the construction of a robust and stable baseline schedule. This schedule is either optimized by incorporating uncertainty into two surrogate measures or obtained by simulation. Robustness is measured by the expected schedule performance, while stability is measured by the aggregation of dissatisfactions of manager, shopfloor operator, and customers using the prospect theory. In the reactive stage, we assume that the stochastic and dynamic disruptions concurrently occur. Unlike the simple right-shifting method, a more effective rescheduling approach is proposed to balance the realized schedule performance with stability. A common issue in these two stages is the conflict between objectives. Thus, we propose a hybridization strategy that successfully enhances the classic Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA-II and the hybridized algorithm outperforms NSGA-II, multiobjective evolutionary algorithm based on decomposition, and multiobjective memetic algorithms designed for deterministic scheduling problems. Finally, extensive computational studies on the Taillard flowshop benchmark instances are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed proactive-reactive approach and the algorithm hybridization strategy.

Fiscal decentralization is one of the tools for the central government to engage local governments in environment management. However, its effects are inconclusive. This paper aims to examine the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution and the role of government environmental preference in China’s provinces. The results show that fiscal revenue decentralization exacerbates local environmental pollution more seriously than expenditure decentralization. This negative environmental effect of fiscal decentralization could be moderated by government environmental preference. Based on our findings, it is recommended that China’s local governments should improve environmental preference so that fiscal decentralization can create a win–win situation for the economy and environment. Furthermore, the different effects of fiscal revenue and expenditure decentralization create a necessity for differentiated management of fiscal decentralization by the central and local governments.