With the rapid development of the cyber economy and green consumption demand, more and more consumers choose to purchase green products through e-commerce platforms. Considering the product green degree and the e-commerce platform's service, the paper studies the decisions and coordination of green e-commerce supply chain under green manufactures’ fairness concerns. The centralised model and the decentralised models with and without fairness concern are constructed and analysed with consideration of product green degree and service level. Then, the ‘cost-sharing joint commission’ contract is proposed to realise system coordination. Finally, propositions and conclusions are verified by numerical simulation. The results indicate that unlike traditional offline and dual-channel supply chains, the manufacturer's behaviour in response to fairness concerns can result in the decline both in product green degree and system efficiency but has no impact on service level. Under the centralised model, the product green degree is not the highest but is more affected by consumers’ green preferences. In addition, the product price and the service level will reach the highest under the centralised model. The increase in green technology investments can downsize the feasible interval of the contract, and the consumers’ green preferences can extend the feasible interval.

The decision-making and coordination of an e-commerce supply chain (ECSC) with manufacturer fairness concerns by incorporating the e-commerce platform into the decision-making process is studied in this paper. An ECSC composed of a single manufacturer and a single e-commerce platform is developed, and the optimal decisions for three scenarios are investigated, namely, a decentralised decision-making model without consideration of fairness concerns, a decentralised decision-making model considering manufacturer fairness concerns, and a centralised decision-making model. Then, a comparative analysis of the optimal decisions of the different models is conducted. On this basis, a coordination mechanism for the decentralised decision-making models is further proposed, and finally, a numerical analysis is employed to verify the conclusions. The research shows that the e-commerce platform, although it is the dominant party, obtains less profit than the manufacturer due to the unique operation characteristics of the ECSC. The sales price, service level, and profit of the ECSC are maximised in the centralised decision-making model, and they are not affected by the commission rate. The sales price, service level and profit of the decentralised decision-making model that considers manufacturer fairness concerns are inferior to those for the model that considers fairness concerns, indicating that manufacturer fairness concerns reduce system efficiency. In addition, a ‘cost sharing joint commission’ contract can be used to coordinate an ECSC.

Fierce market competition and consumers’ environmental awareness prompt manufacturers to gain competitive advantages through low-carbon production. However, many firms stay away from low carbon because of financial constraints. Considering chain-to-chain competition, this paper constructs three financing strategic models. The impacts of market competition intensity and consumers’ low-carbon preference on equilibrium decisions and corporate profits are analyzed. Then, comparative analysis is conducted to find the optimal financing strategy. Finally, numerical simulation is used for further analysis and robustness tests. It is indicated that under chain-to-chain competition, low-carbon production cannot improve the negative impact of increased competition intensity on corporate profits. Intense competition weakens the manufacturer’s emission reduction efforts. Moreover, the manufacturer does not always benefit more from internal financing though the low-carbon level is high. When the probability of obtaining a bank loan exceeds the threshold, bank financing is superior to internal financing. An increased low-carbon investment cost coefficient will lower the threshold, which is counterintuitive. Since the preference interval for the downstream retailer to provide prepayments is larger than the interval for the low-carbon manufacturer to choose internal financing, both parties have the incentive to negotiate prepayments. Under internal financing, the wholesale price discount does not affect corporate profits.