This study aimed to comprehensively examine the interactions between actors within the innovation system, focusing specifically on the disposition and utilization of intellectual property rights (IPRs). In order to achieve the stated objective, mathematical modeling, rooted in game theory was adopted to simulate these interactions to identify strategically stable behaviors among stakeholders. Essentially, the study led to the development of a game-theoretic model that described the interaction between IPR holders alongside respective followers. This model effectively considered the impact of public policy on IP protection as a factor in offense detection. The analysis conducted during the course of the investigation thoroughly examined various strategies for protecting IP, including the registration of utility model and invention patents as well as the use of smart contracts for IP registration. Within this context, the use of a smart contract, which is defined as a self-executing contract implemented in the blockchain, where respective terms and conditions are fixed by the parties directly through lines of code, was considered as an alternative strategy for protecting IP. Followers, on the other hand, were observed to adopt a spectrum of strategies, ranging from the acquisition of a license for the legitimate use of IP to imitating innovative processes. For each strategic pathway, a utility function was specified in order to account for innovation profits and costs. The values assigned to the components of these utility functions in line with the existing legislation governing patents in the Russian Federation for 2024. The results obtained from the investigation of the static model, which was specifically carried out to identify the equilibrium, showed that, with regard to the probability of detecting offenses and the amount of penalty, followers adopted different strategies depending on the level of supervision. For instance, when the level of supervision is low or medium, followers were observed to predominantly imitate innovations, and when it is high, the demographic tend to posseess a greater tendency to acquire a license. When supervision is average, the subgame equilibrium was characterized by the following combination: ({Smart contract}; {Imitation Innovation, Imitation Innovation, Imitation Innovation}). Under this equilibrium, the payoff profile was (571,687; 115,475). When supervision is low, the equilibrium remained unchanged, and the resulting payoffs for right holders and followers amounted to (571,687; 131,475), respectively. Simultaneously, the selection of an IP registration strategy through the utilization of a smart contract remains unaltered for rights holders. The novelty of the present study lies in the fact that it introduced additional factors of influence from the state and analyzed the choice of agents' strategies by checking the evolutionary stability of each equilibrium point at different values of payment elements.