Purpose: This paper examines how differences in the family involvement in a family business can influence its level of indebtedness. Assuming the influence of family is not the same for all family firms, we consider each company as a combination of the family involvement in three dimensions of the business: ownership, management and governance structure.Design/methodology/approach: Using the partial least squares technique allows us to address the heterogeneity of family firms through an integral concept of family involvement in business that jointly considers the level of family participation in the ownership, management and governance structure of each firm.Findings: Our results demonstrate that the level of family involvement in a family firm, considering the heterogeneity existing within the family business group, directly influences its level of indebtedness. In addition, we find that family involvement in ownership and governance structures individually considered are positively related to the level of indebtedness of the family business.Originality/value: Our findings prove that some indebtedness patterns, which previous literature has described as common to all Spanish family businesses, may actually be valid only for specific family firms with a particular level of family involvement. In addition, the way of measuring family business heterogeneity through our integral concept of family involvement can be replicated by other authors because of the manageability of the items, thus contributing to an increased understanding of the effects of family involvement in firms' development.

Cash holding decision‐making is one of the main corporate challenges for family firms (FFs), with significant consequences for their growth and survival. It is closely connected to key financial decisions such as financing, investments, and dividends. The motivations behind adjusting cash holdings vary, encompassing precautionary, risk avoidance, opportunity cost considerations, and the spending hypothesis. In our study, we aim to integrate specific motivations for cash holding decisions that stem from the influence of family dynamics within these businesses since FFs have unique characteristics, which affect their financial choices. Therefore, we analyze the impact of family involvement in management and the generational stage of FFs on their level of cash holdings. The results of the partial least squares–structural equation modeling, which was estimated on a sample of 7269 unlisted Spanish FFs, show that the higher the level of family involvement in management, as well as the higher the generational stage, the higher the level of cash holdings, with this having a positive effect on the firm's performance. In addition, we find that the positive relationship between family involvement in management and the level of cash holdings is strengthened by family ownership and weakened by family governance. These findings are relevant for a better understanding of the complexity of cash holding decision‐making in FFs and have practical implications not only for the FFs themselves but also for the entities related to them due to the important links between a firm's liquidity and its risk of default and performance.