Juan Li

Dr. Juan Li


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 May 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XTXuezhen Tu
Xuezhen Tu
Kun ZhuKun Zhu
Kun Zhu
Nguyen Cong LuongNguyen Cong Luong
Nguyen Cong Luong
DNDusit Niyato
Dusit Niyato
YZYang Zhang
Yang Zhang
JLJuan Li
Juan Li
Federated learning (FL) becomes popular and has shown great potentials in training large-scale machine learning (ML) models without exposing the owners’ raw data. In FL, the data owners can train ML models based on their local data and only send the model updates rather than raw data to the model owner for aggregation. To improve learning performance in terms of model accuracy and training completion time, it is essential to recruit sufficient participants. Meanwhile, the data owners are rational and may be unwilling to participate in the collaborative learning process due to the resource consumption. To address the issues, there have been various works recently proposed to motivate the data owners to contribute their resources. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive review for the economic and game theoretic approaches proposed in the literature to design various schemes for incentivizing data owners to participate in FL training process. In particular, we first present the fundamentals and background of FL, economic theories commonly used in incentive mechanism design. Then, we review applications of game theory and economic approaches applied for incentive mechanisms design of FL. Finally, we highlight some open issues and future research directions concerning incentive mechanism design of FL.

11 September 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DLDenghui Liu
Denghui Liu
RCRuoyang Chen
Ruoyang Chen
Changyan YiChangyan Yi
Changyan Yi
Tong ZhangTong Zhang
Tong Zhang
Xiaolong LiXiaolong Li
Xiaolong Li
Kun ZhuKun Zhu
Kun Zhu
This paper investigates a dynamic game framework for physical layer security (PLS)-aware wireless network with third-party collaborative users (TCUs). In the considered system, legitimate users (LUs) aim to transmit secret signals under the threat of eavesdroppers (EVs). There exists TCUs rationally selecting to form coalitions with LUs or EVs, strategically enhancing the secrecy transmission rates for LUs or increasing eavesdropping rates for EVs to obtain rewards. Due to the unpredictability of wireless systems (e.g., time-varying channel conditions, user mobility), coalitions among the three parties may be unfixed and dynamically changing. A hierarchical game integrating a matching subgame with a coalition formation subgame is formulated to model the interactions among LUs, EVs, and TCUs. In order to derive the optimal long-term strategies while solving the equilibrium of the hierarchical game, we first introduce a constrained Gale-Shapley algorithm which determines the optimal power, mode, and channel selections of TCUs with the known coalition partition, and then propose a coalition selection algorithm for reaching the stability of coalition partitions. Moreover, we develop a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based solution to concatenate the aforementioned algorithms, producing the long-term optimal strategies for LUs, EVs and TCUs over multiple time slots. Simulations evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, and demonstrate its superiority over counterparts.

20 December 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JLJuan Li
Juan Li
ZCZishang Chen
Zishang Chen
TZTianzi Zang
Tianzi Zang
TLTong Liu
Tong Liu
JWJie Wu
Jie Wu
Yanmin ZhuYanmin Zhu
Yanmin Zhu
Federated learning participants have two identities: model trainers and model users. As model users, participants care most about the performance of the final model on their own distributions, which is called Personal Model Performance (PMP). This makes training a single global model to accommodate all participants impractical because the data distributions of participants are heterogeneous. As model trainers, due to high training costs, participants are reluctant to contribute models if incentives are not enough. With the combination of the above two reasons, we propose a dual-identity double auction as an incentive mechanism in personalized federated learning, allowing directional selection between model users and model trainers, both of which are served by FL participants. Within the double auction framework, we devise a reinforcement learning-based model selection method. This method selects a set of models for each buyer to bid on. The bought models are aggregated to be a personalized model to achieve higher PMP. Additionally, we implement a transaction partition-based approach for determining clearing prices and winning pairs. We address the challenge of the unavailability of private yet essential data distribution information, the coupled influence of model selection and auction results on PMP, and more utility improvement ways of multi-demand dual-identity participants. Finally, our double auction optimizes the PMP of all participants and ensures the truthfulness of multi-demand dual-identity participants, which is harder compared with single-demand single-identity participants.

13 June 2022 in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Kun ZhuKun Zhu
Kun Zhu
JLJiawei Liang
Jiawei Liang
JLJuan Li
Juan Li
Changyan YiChangyan Yi
Changyan Yi
Coded distributed computing(CDC) has shown great potentials to solve the unexpected delay caused by stragglers in distributed computing. In this paper, we focus on the auction design for efficient resource allocation in CDC. Specifically, we aim to design a learning auction mechanism to handle heterogeneous user demands and also to free users from the complexity of specifying valuations for resource combinations, which increases exponentially with the resource dimensions. The user demand type is heterogeneous according to different variation trends of the value with finish time and workload, which is modeled by deep learning. The platform would allocate resources according to the user value function. Then users do not need to consider the complex relationship between uncertain finish time and resource configuration in CDC. Due to the inference error of the learning model and the complexity of calculating uncertain finish time, the considered social welfare optimization problem is a non-linear and non-convex integer problem. Even worse, the typical VCG-based payment scheme cannot guarantee truthfulness with the inference error. In response to these difficulties, we transform the social welfare optimization problem into a mixed integer programming problem which already has efficient solutions. The social welfare gap caused by the inference error is analyzed theoretically. The relationship between the utility regret of reporting truthfully and the inference error is also analyzed. We prove that our mechanism satisfies incentive alignment and individual rationality. Extensive experiments show the superiority of our mechanism compared with existing ones.

1 October 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
JYJiaju Yu
Jiaju Yu
SYShuanghe Yu
Shuanghe Yu
JLJuan Li
Juan Li
Yan YanYan Yan
Yan Yan
In this note, we investigate the fixed time consensus in probability for stochastic multi-agent systems under undirected graph. First, a nonlinear consensus protocol with Gaussian white noise is given, and the concept of fixed-time consensus in probability is given. Second, we prove that multi-agent systems can achieve fixed-time consensus in probability under undirected topology by using graph theory, stochastic Lyapunov theory and probability theory. Finally, a simulation example is given to verify the effectiveness of the theory results.

18 January 2024 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HCHui Cai
Hui Cai
CBChao Bian
Chao Bian
BSBiyun Sheng
Biyun Sheng
JZJian Zhou
Jian Zhou
JLJuan Li
Juan Li
XHXin He
Xin He
In addition to federated optimization, more current studies focus on incentive mechanism design problems for federated learning (FL), stimulating data owners to share their resources securely. Most existing works only considered data quantity but neglected other key factors like data quality and training time prediction. In combination with all the above factors, we proposed an online quality-aware incentive mechanism based on multi-dimensional reverse auction, QuoTa, for achieving fast FL. In particular, it first designs model quality detection to eliminate some malicious or dispensable devices based on their historical behaviors and marginal contributions. Due to the possible fluctuations of CPU frequency in realistic model training, it next predicts model training time based on the upper confidence bound algorithm. By combining the two modules, QuoTa incentivizes data owners with high data quality, high computing capability, and low cost to participate in the FL process. By rigorous theoretical proof and extensive experiments, we prove that QuoTa satisfies all desired economic properties and achieves higher model accuracy and less convergence time than the state-of-the-art work.