‘Heuristic’ theories of autism postulate that a single mechanism or process underpins the diverse psychological features of autism spectrum disorder. Although no such theory can offer a comprehensive account, the parsimonious descriptions they provide are powerful catalysts to autism research. One recent proposal holds that ‘noisy’ neuronal signalling explains not only some deficits in autism spectrum disorder, but also some superior abilities, due to ‘stochastic resonance’. Here, we discuss three distinct actions of noise in neural networks, arguing in each case that autism spectrum disorder symptoms reflect too little, rather than too much, neural noise. Such reduced noise, perhaps a function of atypical brainstem activation, would enhance detection and discrimination in autism spectrum disorder but at significant cost, foregoing the widespread benefits of noise in neural networks.
Recent research on human agency suggests that intentional causation is associated with a subjective compression in the temporal interval between actions and their effects. That is, intentional movements and their causal effects are perceived as closer together in time than equivalent unintentional movements and their causal effects. This so-called intentional binding effect is consistently found for one’s own self-generated actions. It has also been suggested that intentional binding occurs when observing intentional movements of others. However, this evidence is undermined by limitations of the paradigm used. In the current study we aimed to overcome these limitations using a more rigorous design in combination with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to explore the neural underpinnings of intentional binding of observed movements. In particular, we aimed to identify brain areas sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causality attributed to the observed action. Our behavioral results confirmed the occurrence of intentional binding for observed movements using this more rigorous paradigm. Our fMRI results highlighted a collection of brain regions whose activity was sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causation. Intriguingly, these brain regions have previously been implicated in the sense of agency over one’s own movements. We discuss the implications of these results for intentional binding specifically, and the sense of agency more generally.
Human observers can determine whether natural scenes contain an animal or not on the basis of as little as 20 ms viewing; a phenomenon termed ultra-rapid categorization (URC). Recent studies have suggested that URC is unimpaired even when attention resources are concurrently devoted to a second task. This apparent independence of URC from availability of attention resources presents a challenge for the conventional view of high-level vision as attention-demanding. However, one notable feature of the scenes employed in those experiments is that they almost universally comprised only one or two foreground objects. Here, we investigate whether these findings generalize to more complex scenes, more typical of those in nature. We find that categorization of scenes with four primary foreground objects is greatly impaired when attention resources are limited under dual-task conditions, even when scenes are presented for 500 ms. In contrast, URC of scenes with one foreground object is only mildly impaired—the magnitude of this impairment being equivalent to that observed for single objects presented in isolation without naturalistic scene backgrounds. We conclude that URC of complex scenes is particularly attention-dependent but that some attention resources are probably necessary even for URC of simple one-object scenes.