(1) Background: Cognitive failures, including lapses in attention, memory, and executive functioning, can negatively affect daily performance and well-being. Negative and positive affectivity have been implicated in cognitive functioning, yet their relationship with cognitive failures remains underexplored. This study investigates the impact of positive and negative affect on cognitive failures, using daily diary methods to examine both within-person and between-person associations in a sample of younger adults from Singapore and adults across the lifespan from the United States (US). (2) Methods: Participants (Singapore: N = 253, US: N = 1726) completed daily diaries over seven (Singapore) or eight (US) consecutive days. Multilevel modelling was used to analyse both within- and between-person relationships between affect and cognitive failures, controlling for demographic and socioeconomic variables. (3) Results: In both the Singapore and US samples, negative affect was consistently positively associated with cognitive failures at both levels (SG within-person: β = 0.21, p < 0.001; SG between-person: β = 0.58, p < 0.001; US within-person: β = 0.08, p < 0.001; US between-person: β = 0.28, p < 0.001), supporting the influence of negative affective experiences on cognitive lapses. However, positive affect showed no significant associations with daily cognitive failures in the Singapore sample (within-person: β = 0.01, p = 0.683; between-person: β = −0.04, p = 0.484) and only a between-person negative association in the US sample (within-person: β = 0.02, p = 0.157; between-person: β = −0.11, p < 0.001). (4) Conclusion: These findings suggest that positive and negative affect differentially influence individual differences and intra-individual changes in daily cognitive failures among both younger and older adults.

Objective: While intellectual humility has gained increasing prominence as a cognitive construct, its implications for affective well‐being remain less understood. Method: The present paper draws on 7‐day daily diary datasets (Study 1: N _participants = 253, N _observations = 1721; Study 2: N _participants = 485, N _observations = 3218) to examine how trait intellectual humility relates to daily positive and negative affect during uplifting and stressful events. We also tested potential mechanisms underlying the link between intellectual humility and affective well‐being by examining whether intellectual humility moderates affective reactions to daily events or whether it indirectly enhances affective well‐being by influencing the frequency of daily uplift and stressor exposure. Results: Across both studies, intellectual humility was associated with less daily negative affect. Associations with daily positive affect remained significant until Big Five personality was included. There was no evidence that intellectual humility moderated affective reactivity to daily uplifts or stressors. Instead, mediation analyses supported a pathway where intellectual humility indicated more daily uplift exposure, which predicted less daily negative affect. Daily stressor exposure showed limited indirect effects. Conclusions: These findings suggest that intellectual humility supports affective well‐being by influencing the frequency and nature of daily experiences. This research demonstrates how intellectual humility contributes to emotional well‐being in everyday life.

The current research examined if dispositional optimism buffers against negative consequences of daily stressor exposure. The work also provides a direct test of positive affect as a mediator, in line with the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. Study 1 utilised data from a US older-adult sample ( N = 958, M _age = 62.57, 45% male) to examine optimism’s buffering role on affective (negative affect) and cognitive (rumination) outcomes. Study 2 extended these findings with a Singapore young adult sample ( N = 995, M _age = 21.93, 27% male), incorporating behavioural outcomes (procrastination and impulsivity), introducing additional affective indicators (depressive and anxious mood), and broadening the cognitive domain to include cognitive failure in addition to rumination. Using multilevel regression and multivariate modelling, we found that optimism acted as a buffer against all indicators across both studies, except for anxious mood and procrastination. Trait positive affect mediated the associations between optimism and negative affect (in Study 1), rumination (in Study 1 but not in Study 2), and depressive mood, impulsivity and cognitive failure (in Study 2). These findings shed light on the boundary conditions of the buffering effect of dispositional optimism and the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used across various contexts, yet existing research offers no comprehensive measure of the distinct purposes that motivate such use. Across five studies comprising four quantitative samples (N=1,165), the present research developed and validated the 30-item, six-dimensional Motivations to AI Use Scale. Study 1 used open-ended responses and thematic analysis to identify candidate motivations, while Study 2 refined the item pool through readability analysis and content validation. Exploratory factor analysis in Study 3 identified six related but distinct dimensions reflecting AI use motivated by learning, productivity, exploration, social support, impression management, and effort avoidance. Study 4a confirmed the six-factor structure, established measurement invariance across sex and age groups, and supported internal discriminant validity among the dimensions. Study 4b further supported external construct validity through differentiated associations with theoretically relevant AI-related constructs and motivations for social networking site use, while broader correlational analyses revealed distinct profiles across psychological needs, personality, and affect. Finally, Study 5 demonstrated moderate-to-good absolute agreement and strong rank-order stability over a one-week interval. These findings support the Motivations to AI Use Scale as a reliable and valid multidimensional measure of the distinct purposes for which individuals engage with generative AI, providing a foundation for examining how motivational profiles relate to different forms and consequences of human-AI engagement.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly embedded within forensic psychological practice, shaping how criminal risk, legal responsibility and public safety are assessed. AI tools are now used in recidivism prediction, behavioural analysis, deception detection and investigative support, high‐stakes domains where errors can have profound consequences. Despite this rapid adoption, the existing literature remains fragmented, with most reviews confined to narrow subdomains and offering limited integrated synthesis of AI′s broader role in forensic psychology. Thus, this umbrella review addresses this gap by synthesising findings from 43 reviews obtained from five major databases, namely EBSCOhost ERIC, EBSCOhost PsycInfo, PubMed, Scopus and Web of Science. Across the reviewed literature, our umbrella review suggests that AI is positioned as offering several potential benefits for forensic psychological work, including improved predictive accuracy, real‐time threat monitoring, more optimised resource allocation, enhanced analysis of complex behavioural data and more objective decision‐making. At the same time, the present review highlights persistent pitfalls that may constrain the reliability and defensibility of current applications. These include the reinforcement of bias and disparities, limited transparency and explainability, over‐reliance that may undermine human judgement, data constraints and overfitting, ethical and legal risks and substantial implementation and computational demands that may inhibit real‐world application. Overall, this review underscores the need for rigorous safeguards to ensure that AI enhances rather than compromises forensic decision‐making.