Elena  Andreeva

Dr. Elena Andreeva

Department of Electrical Engineering, ESAT/COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 August 2015
Verified
Book Chapter
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EAElena Andreeva
Elena Andreeva
JDJoan Daemen
Joan Daemen
BMBart Mennink
Bart Mennink
GAGilles Van Assche
Gilles Van Assche

22 November 2019
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
EAElena Andreeva
Elena Andreeva
VLVirginie Lallemand
Virginie Lallemand
APAntoon Purnal
Antoon Purnal
RRReza Reyhanitabar
Reza Reyhanitabar
ARArnab Roy
Arnab Roy
DVDamian Vizár
Damian Vizár

19 April 2015
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
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EAElena Andreeva
Elena Andreeva
BBBegül Bilgin
Begül Bilgin
ABAndrey Bogdanov
Andrey Bogdanov
ALAtul Luykx
Atul Luykx
BMBart Mennink
Bart Mennink
KYKan Yasuda
Kan Yasuda

23 June 2015 in Journal of Cryptology
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Journal Article
Open access
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EAElena Andreeva
Elena Andreeva
CBCharles Bouillaguet
Charles Bouillaguet
ODOrr Dunkelman
Orr Dunkelman
PFPierre-Alain Fouque
Pierre-Alain Fouque
JHJonathan Hoch
Jonathan Hoch
SZSébastien Zimmer
Sébastien Zimmer
In this work, we present several new generic second-preimage attacks on hash functions. Our first attack is based on the herding attack and applies to various Merkle–Damgård-based iterative hash functions. Compared to the previously known long-message second-preimage attacks, our attack offers more flexibility in choosing the second-preimage message at the cost of a small computational overhead. More concretely, our attack allows the adversary to replace only a few blocks in the original target message to obtain the second preimage. As a result, our new attack is applicable to constructions previously believed to be immune to such second-preimage attacks. Among others, these include the dithered hash proposal of Rivest, Shoup’s UOWHF, and the ROX constructions. In addition, we also suggest several time-memory-data tradeoff attack variants, allowing for a faster online phase, and even finding second preimages for shorter messages. We further extend our attack to sequences stronger than the ones suggested in Rivest’s proposal. To this end we introduce the kite generator as a new tool to attack any dithering sequence over a small alphabet. Additionally, we analyse the second-preimage security of the basic tree hash construction. Here we also propose several second-preimage attacks and their time-memory-data tradeoff variants. Finally, we show how both our new and the previous second-preimage attacks can be applied even more efficiently when multiple short messages, rather than a single long target message, are available.

8 July 2014
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
EAElena Andreeva
Elena Andreeva
ABAndrey Bogdanov
Andrey Bogdanov
BMBart Mennink
Bart Mennink

28 May 2015 in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
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Journal Article
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EAElena Andreeva
Elena Andreeva
BMBart Mennink
Bart Mennink
BPBart Preneel
Bart Preneel