Intense interest in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was stimulated when US$46 billion of investment agreements were signed in April 2015, a sum which two years later increased to US$62 billion. A major focus of CPEC is on developing overland transportation and pipeline links from the port of Gwadar to the Chinese province of Xinjiang as a land-based alternative to the maritime ‘chokepoint’ of the Straits of Malacca. This article assesses the viability of pipelines connecting China to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan via a close analysis of evidence obtained from both primary and secondary sources. It concludes that the overland connection is beset with difficulties because of geographical, economic and security problems, and that China’s long-term motivations for maintaining a presence in Pakistan are likely to be chiefly geopolitical rather than geo-economic. In fact, China’s primary aim with CPEC and other investments is to hedge against India by establishing a physical presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), a strategy which is herein referred to as geo-positional balancing.
30 January 2020 in Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
Drawing on the literature on strategic hedging and adapting it to China’s use of economic diplomacy in the service of comprehensive national security goals within the regionalised foreign policy approach of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), we examine China’s approach to securing and expanding its interests in the Persian Gulf. To implement the trade and infrastructure connectivity goals of the BRI and to secure the continued flow of diversified energy supplies, China needs to boost relations with both regional powerhouses, Iran and Saudi Arabia, without alienating either of them or the regional hegemon, the United States. The resulting strategy of strategic hedging is based in the Chinese approach to economic diplomacy, which utilises Chinese commercial actors in the service of national strategic objectives. Relations require careful and ongoing management if China is to achieve outcomes which benefit all sides while avoiding becoming entangled in the region’s intractable geopolitical problems.
Since China launched the 16 + 1 forum for meetings with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in 2012, European observers have struggled to understand the Chinese approach. In contrast to its oft-repeated claim of ‘win–win’ cooperation, some believe China is pursuing an assertive strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ designed to benefit China at Europe’s expense. China’s economic diplomacy in CEE is examined through the critical lens of Holslag’s ‘offensive mercantilism’ framework, finding it useful for assessing empirical aspects of China’s approach to CEE, but failing to find evidence for the assertion that China’s economic diplomacy is divisive and bad for Europe.