We consider a two-sided market under incomplete preference lists with ties, where the goal is to find a maximum size stable matching. The problem is APX-hard, and a 3/2-approximation was given by McDermid [1]. This algorithm has a non-linear running time, and, more importantly needs global knowledge of all preference lists. We present a very natural, economically reasonable, local, linear time algorithm with the same ratio, using some ideas of Paluch [2]. In this algorithm every person make decisions using only their own list, and some information asked from members of these lists (as in the case of the famous algorithm of Gale and Shapley). Some consequences to the Hospitals/Residents problem are also discussed.

One of the first graph-theoretical problems to be given serious attention (in the 1950s) was the decision whether a given integer sequence is equal to the degree sequence of a simple graph (orgraphical, for short). One method to solve this problem is the greedy algorithm of Havel and Hakimi, which is based on theswapoperation. Another, closely related question is to find a sequence of swap operations to transform one graphical realization into another of the same degree sequence. This latter problem has received particular attention in the context of rapidly mixing Markov chain approaches to uniform sampling of all possible realizations of a given degree sequence. (This becomes a matter of interest in the context of the study of large social networks, for example.) Previously there were only crude upper bounds on the shortest possible length of such swap sequences between two realizations. In this paper we develop formulae (Gallai-type identities) for theswap-distances of any two realizations of simple undirected or directed degree sequences. These identities considerably improve the known upper bounds on the swap-distances.