We analyze how an incumbent antibiotic monopolist responds to the threat of post-entry Bertrand competition by a vertically differentiated rival. In a two-period model where current production drives future resistance, Bertrand competition leads to a winner-take-all outcome. We find that strategic deterrence is optimal regardless of bacterial cross-resistance to prospective rival drugs. In contrast with post-entry Cournot competition, anticipated price competition provides the incumbent with a stronger strategic incentive for conservation.
Standard jump-diffusion models assume independence between jumps and diffusion components. We develop a multi-type jump-diffusion model where jump occurrence and magnitude depend on contemporaneous diffusion movements. Unlike previous one-sided models that create arbitrage opportunities, our framework includes upward and downward jumps triggered by both large upward and large downward diffusion increments. We derive the explicit no-arbitrage condition linking the physical drift to model parameters and market risk premia by constructing an Equivalent Martingale Measure using Girsanov's theorem and a normalized Esscher transform. This condition provides a rigorous foundation for arbitrage-free pricing in models with diffusion-dependent jumps.