In the field of adaptation governance research, current discussion on the barriers to adaptation shows that theoretical explanations for why institutions emerge and how they enable or constrain adaptation are underdeveloped. In this Perspective, we show that there is a significant opportunity to advance the understanding of adaptation governance by integrating insights that have been developed in the extensive commons literature on the institutions that work to overcome social conflicts or dilemmas. 'Realist-materialist' approaches to understanding such collective action are particularly valuable to adaptation governance research because they emphasize how biophysical conditions give rise to certain types of social dilemma. Climate change affects these biophysical conditions, and thus may alter dilemmas or create new ones. Based on realist-materialist reasoning, this Perspective describes six types of dilemma, illustrates each with a case from the adaptation literature and draws on insights from the commons literature regarding relevant contextual conditions and effective policy instruments for overcoming social dilemmas. The dilemma types provide entry points for rigorous comparative adaptation research to deepen understanding of how context influences adaptation governance processes. Download references

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to present a formal framework of vulnerability to climate change, to address the conceptual confusion around vulnerability and related concepts.Design/methodology/approach: The framework was developed using the method of formalisation – making structure explicit. While mathematics as a precise and general language revealed common structures in a large number of vulnerability definitions and assessments, the framework is here presented by diagrams for a non‐mathematical audience.Findings: Vulnerability, in ordinary language, is a measure of possible future harm. Scientific vulnerability definitions from the fields of climate change, poverty, and natural hazards share and refine this structure. While theoretical definitions remain vague, operational definitions, that is, methodologies for assessing vulnerability, occur in three distinct types: evaluate harm for projected future evolutions, evaluate the current capacity to reduce harm, or combine the two. The framework identifies a lack of systematic relationship between theoretical and operational definitions.Originality/value: While much conceptual literature tries to clarify vulnerability, formalisation is a new method in this interdisciplinary field. The resulting framework is an analytical tool which supports clear communication: it helps when making assumptions explicit. The mismatch between theoretical and operational definitions is not made explicit in previous work.

Coastal adaptation can reduce climate change impacts and investing now, though costly, will bring greater benefits over the longer term, particularly in urban areas. Yet public actors currently cover a small fraction of needed coastal adaptation investments, a finance gap set to widen as coastal adaptation costs continue to increase. Mobilizing private finance for coastal adaptation is thus a salient challenge, as emphasized in the Paris Agreement. Key under‐researched dimensions of this challenge are what promotes private investment in coastal adaptation and how can public actors’ interest in adaptation be aligned with private investor interests. To address this, we review the literatures on coastal adaptation finance and on financial arrangements involving both public actors and private investors. We describe key actors and interests, and identify coastal financial arrangements that align public actor and private investor interests, finding that private provisioning, public–private Partnerships (PPP), and public debt arrangements are promising. We then survey empirical examples, finding that private provisioning attracts investment when returns are high, for example, in urban real estate, and that PPPs attract dredging and construction companies’ investment, particularly for adaptation measures with a large share of operational costs, for example, beach nourishment. We find little evidence of institutional investment through public debt instruments. A number of policy instruments, for example, concessional loans, tax incentives, and standards, may address this gap and enhance private coastal adaptation investment. Our results are also relevant for other sectors that involve long‐term infrastructure adaptation measures.This article is categorized under: Climate Economics > Iterative Risk‐Management Policy Portfolios Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change > Learning from Cases and Analogies