Tor hidden services are used to provide anonymity services to users on the Internet without disclosing the location of the servers so as to enable freedom of speech. However, existing Tor hidden services use decentralized architecture that makes it easier for an adversary to launch DHT-based attacks. In this paper, we present practical Eclipse attacks on Tor hidden services that allow an adversary with an extremely low cost to block arbitrary Tor hidden services. We found that the dominant cost of this attack is IP address resources, the experimental results show that we can use only 3 IP addresses to eclipse an arbitrary hidden service with 100% success probability. To understand the severity of the Eclipse attack problems on Tor hidden services, and its security implications, we present the first formal analysis to evaluate the extent of threat such vulnerabilities may cause and quantify the costs of Eclipse attacks involved in our attack via probabilistic analysis. Theoretical analysis suggests that adversaries with a modest number of IP address resources can block a large number of hidden services at any time. Finally, we discuss countermeasures and future works.
19 May 2022 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Privacy is currently one of the most concerned issues in Cyberspace. Tor is the most widely used system in the world for anonymously accessing Internet. However, Tor is known to be vulnerable to end-to-end traffic correlation attacks when an adversary is able to monitor traffic at both communication endpoints. In this paper, we present a set of novel Trapper Attacks that can be used to deanonymize user activities by both AS-level adversaries and Node-level adversaries in a Tor network. First, AS-level adversaries can exploit the occasional failures of censored network to selectively control entry guards of the Tor users. Second, the adversaries can exploit poor reliability of the Tor communication (e.g., natural churn) to compromise the exiting nodes and the anonymous path. Once the adversaries gain control of the routes, they can identify and inspect any traffic entering and leaving the Tor network, consequently, deanonymize a Tor user’s activity in the network. To demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of this attacks, we implemented a tool that can launch the proposed Trapper Attacks to automatic reveal communication relationships between a Tor user and its destinations running on a live Tor network. We also present a formal analysis framework to evaluate the integrity of the Tor network. With this framework, we successfully obtained quantitative estimates of Tor’s security vulnerability. The proposed Trapper Attacks are also designed to scale up in real-world Tor networks. Namely, it allows an adversary to perform deanonymization in honey relays effectively, and compromise the anonymity of Tor clients in real time. Our experimental results show that the proposed attacks succeed in less than 40 seconds achieving a 100% accuracy rate and a false positive rate close to 0.
5 December 2023 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Federated learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoT), which allows multiple devices to collaboratively train models without leaking local data. In the open scenario of IoT, malicious devices can launch poisoning attacks to compromise the final model by submitting crafted gradients. Some previous studies defend against poisoning attacks by analyzing the statistical characteristics of plaintext gradients. However, plaintext gradients would expose private information to malicious FL devices or servers. To simultaneously resist poisoning attacks and preserve privacy, cryptography technology can be utilized to obfuscate the gradients in defense methods, but the private calculation of resisting poisoning attack methods will cause efficiency problems, especially imposing unaffordable overhead on resource-limited IoT devices. Therefore, resisting poisoning attacks efficiently while protecting privacy remains a challenge. This article proposes a secure and privacy-enhanced FL (SPEFL) framework for efficient privacy-preserving and poisoning-resistant FL in IoT. We design an efficient secure computation protocol based on a three-server architecture to facilitate the cryptographic computation of large linear and complex nonlinear operators in the method against poisoning attacks. In SPEFL, most of the calculations are efficiently performed on the servers, which will not impose too much burden on resource-limited IoT devices. In addition, we design a security-enhanced verifiable protocol to detect the malicious behavior of the server and guarantee the correctness of FL aggregation results. Experimental and theoretical results demonstrate that SPEFL can efficiently complete FL training meanwhile guaranteeing the accuracy of the model.
Due to the strong protection of anonymity, Darknet has been exploited by criminals to distribute harmful content and banned items, such as drugs, weapons, and malware, which are regarded as public hazard entities. The task of public hazard entity recognition can help to detect and analyze malicious activities in the Darknet. This paper focuses on the research of Chinese public hazard entity recognition in the field of illegal drugs. To evade detection and surveillance, Chinese public hazard entities in the Darknet usually utilize disguised forms, like homophones and multi-entities in a sentence, which makes it harder to identify them using traditional entity recognition methods. In this paper, we present an effective deep learning-based multi-information fusion model to identify Chinese public hazard entities in the Darknet. Specifically, we introduce the grammatical information by adding Pinyin and lexical features, and strengthen the semantic features by adding the word vectors from one advanced pre-trained language representation model. Then we combine these three parts with a classical sequence annotation architecture used in general named entity recognition to form our ultimate model. At last we construct a real dataset from drugs-related groups in the Darknet and conduct several experiments to evaluate our model. The experimental result verifies that our proposed model gains a good performance on the recognition of Darknet public hazard entities.
ZeroNet is a new decentralized web-like network of peer-to-peer users created in 2015. ZeroNet, called an open, free and robust network, has attracted a rising number of users. Most of P2P networks are applied into file-sharing systems or data-storage system and the characteristics of these networks are widely investigated. However, there are obvious differences between ZeroNet and conventional P2P networks. Existing researches rarely involve ZeroNet and the characteristics and robustness of ZeroNet are unknown. To tackle the aforementioned problem, the present study measures the ZeroNet peer resources and site resources separately, and at the same time, proposes collection methods for both. No like other simulation experiments, the experiments of this paper are set on real-world environment. This is also the first measurement study about ZeroNet. Experimental results show that the topology of the peer network in ZeroNet has scarce edges, short distances and low clustering coefficients, and its degree distribution exhibits a special distribution. These indicate that the peer network of ZeroNet has poor robustness and the experimental results of the ZeroNet resilience verify this issue. In addition, this paper represents an improved peer exchange method to enhance the robustness of the ZeroNet. We also measure the topology characteristics, languages, sizes and versions of the sites in ZeroNet. We find that the size of the sites and the client version are also the reasons for the low robustness of the ZeroNet.