The development of Big Data technology initiates an emerging research question of whether and how to invest in Big Data business for supply chain members to establish sustainable competitive edge. The aim of our study was to assess investment in Big Data business and its sustainable effects on supply chain coordination. We considered a two-stage supply chain with one supplier and one retailer who may or may not invest in Big Data business. Five decision-making modes were proposed based on the investment portfolios. The impacts of Big Data business on the profit of the supply chain and its members were analyzed and it was confirmed that a coordination scheme could achieve supply chain coordination. The results indicated that when the Big Data cost met a certain threshold, the profit of the supply chain and its members would increase whether supply chain members choose to invest in Big Data business individually or jointly. A reasonable cost allocation of Big Data business between supply chain members was provided when both members invest in Big Data. In addition, after the members invested jointly, a revenue-sharing contract could be applied to perfectly coordinate the supply chain.

Resale is an effective tool for reward-based crowdfunding creators to make more profit after crowdfunding successfully. On the one hand, funds raised during the crowdfunding affect the resale pricing as a capital constraint; on the other hand, backers’ strategic purchasing behavior in the resale stage can also disturb the creator’s financing target decision-making through affecting resale pricing. In view of this, this paper builds a two-stage crowdfunding model to examine the interaction between the financing target and resale pricing in the presence of strategic backers. The results show that a lower financing amount leads to higher prices in the resale stage due to the rationing effect, and suppresses price volatility due to strategic purchasing behavior. In contrast, a higher financing amount enables the creator to build a large capacity, which does not restrict the resale prices and profit. Besides, in the context of high unit production cost or high backer patience level, there is no need for the creator to set a high financing target at the risk of crowdfunding failure.

As the aviation industry embraces the carbon trading market, the competition between full-service carriers and low-cost carriers in ticket pricing is becoming more complicated and worth studying. To this end, we introduce carbon trading into game theoretical models under different market power structures and use real data from China Eastern Airlines and Spring Airlines on the route from Sanya to Shanghai to study this problem. This differs from the existing literature as empirical research is mainly used in this field. Our main results show that the disparity in market power (Stackelberg game) alleviates competition intensity under carbon trading and leads to higher equilibrium prices than in the Nash game model. Meanwhile, even when the two airlines have similar market power, Spring Airlines still has incentives to voluntarily act as a follower of China Eastern Airlines instead of maintaining equal market power with China Eastern Airlines. Under mild regulation, the uplift of carbon prices promotes higher equilibrium prices and supports larger profits. For the sake of consumer welfare, this suggests that the regulation department should impose stricter regulations and grant subsidies to motivate the airlines to mitigate emissions by introducing clean technologies.