Compound threats—two or more relatively rare and high-consequence events that co-occur in time and space, amplifying their effects—present difficult-to-predict events that can impose potentially grave consequences. While there has been increasing attention placed on modeling the probabilities and outcomes of compounding threats, there are no proposed governance models for compound threats, limiting the ability of policymakers and decisionmakers to manage such crises in the future. We visualize resilience for compound threats to understand how critical functioning and system utility to contain hazards, to absorb losses, and to recover from stressors shifts over time. Using North Carolina as a case study, we conduct a compound threats assessment for disaster risk to showcase its effectiveness in more accurately predicting disaster risk areas, as well highlight the limitations of existing risk models used by policymakers. We propose a resilience-augmented conceptual framework to rethink risk governance for compound threats that allows for speed (specifically flexibility and adaptability) in situations of high uncertainty while working within the rigid, slow-moving boundaries of government and bureaucracy. Finally, we discuss strategies for key actors to apply a resilience-augmented governance approach to compound threats into operational decision-making during crisis situations.

Bridge design typically uses load-based design criteria focused on risk thresholds from engineering practice and standards, overlooking cascading effects on connected infrastructure and regional economies. We argue for a systems-based design that balances risk reduction with resilience — the capacity to recover from disruptions. Using the Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse as a case study, we estimate economic impacts assuming impact on local transportation networks only as well as integrating cascading failures on surrounding infrastructure (e.g., closure of the Port of Baltimore), employing the regional economic model TranSight. Results show combined bridge-and-port disruptions produce substantially larger losses in GDP, employment, disposable income, and labor force, with some indicators not recovering until 2040. The Baltimore region exhibits lower resilience to compounding shocks, highlighting the need for a resilience-based framework that considers interconnected infrastructure. We conclude infrastructure design must move beyond component-focused risk criteria toward an explicit, quantifiable resilience framework.