Cheng Chen

Mr. Cheng Chen


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
15 July 2022 in Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CCCheng Chen
Cheng Chen
HMHamdy Mohamed
Hamdy Mohamed
With the help of fractional differential equations, this article studies the failure morphology, fatigue strength, and fatigue life of corroded reinforced concrete beams under fatigue loading. Studies have shown that the mid-span deflection of low-corrosion reinforced concrete beams is smaller than that of uncorroded reinforced concrete beams. The corrosion-fatigue coupling effect accelerates the fatigue crack growth rate of steel bars. This reduces the fatigue modulus of concrete and causes the stiffness of the beam to degrade. The research results provide a theoretical basis for the fatigue performance evaluation of corroded reinforced concrete beams.

13 November 2025 in Buildings
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CCCheng Chen
Cheng Chen
XTXiaoying Tang
Xiaoying Tang
Metaverse safety training (MST) is popular in highway construction projects (HCPs). While researchers have statically examined the influence of MST, one of the essential gaps is that the interaction among stakeholders on how to improve MST effect is neglected. This paper adopts a game theory approach to illustrate the dynamics among stakeholders, namely, contractors, subcontractors, and construction crews, regarding MST within the framework of HCPs. A tripartite evolutionary game model is developed to analyze the interaction among contractors, subcontractors, and construction crews. The evolutionary stability of the stakeholders’ strategies and the equilibrium point were elucidated by solving the proposed model. A numerical simulation was conducted to validate the rationality of the results. The results show that the choice of behavioral strategies and their evolutionary paths for each stakeholder are closely related to the behavioral strategies of other stakeholders in the game, with significant differences in effects on each other’s initial strategies. The incentive mechanism must match the incentive measures provided to subcontractors and construction crews, ensuring a stable MST. The reward and penalty system implemented by contractors heightens the awareness of subcontractors and construction crews partly. This model provides practical recommendations to enhance training interactions, optimize strategies, increase security awareness, and streamline resource allocation.