Adam David Williams

Dr. Adam David Williams

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 April 2017 in Security Journal
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Journal Article
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ASAlexander Solodov
Alexander Solodov
AWAdam David Williams
Adam David Williams
SHSara Al Hanaei
Sara Al Hanaei
BGBraden Goddard
Braden Goddard

1 December 2015 in Journal of Power Sources
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Journal Article
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DRDavid Rosewater
David Rosewater
AWAdam David Williams
Adam David Williams

17 November 2015 in Journal of Transportation Security
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Journal Article
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AWAdam David Williams
Adam David Williams

1 September 2017
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Report
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PDF file
AWAdam David Williams
Adam David Williams
AMAmir H. Mohagheghi
Amir H. Mohagheghi
BCBrian Cohn
Brian Cohn
DODouglas M. Osborn
Douglas M. Osborn
KJKatherine A. Jones
Katherine A. Jones
BJBrian A. Jeantete
Brian A. Jeantete
In response to the expansion of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activities -- and the associated suite of risks -- around the world, this project evaluated systems-based solutions for managing such risk complexity in multimodal and multi-jurisdictional international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation. By better understanding systemic risks in SNF transportation, developing SNF transportation risk assessment frameworks, and evaluating these systems-based risk assessment frameworks, this research illustrated interdependency between safety, security, and safeguards risks is inherent in NFC activities and can go unidentified when each "S" is independently evaluated. Two novel system-theoretic analysis techniques -- dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) -- provide integrated "3S" analysis to address these interdependencies and the research results suggest a need -- and provide a way -- to reprioritize United States engagement efforts to reduce global nuclear risks. Lastly, this research identifies areas where Sandia National Laboratories can spearhead technical advances to reduce global nuclear dangers.

1 October 2012
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Conference Paper
Closed access
DDDean Dominguez
Dean Dominguez
MPMancel Jordan Parks
Mancel Jordan Parks
AWAdam David Williams
Adam David Williams
SWSusan Washburn
Susan Washburn
Over the last decade, the world has faced a rapidly expanding and dynamic threat environment. As demonstrated by the 9/11 and 26/11 terrorist attacks, adversary capabilities have evolved to include advanced tactics and increased militancy. For the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), and other organizations responsible for protecting facilities housing special nuclear materials, this fragile mix of global uncertainty makes nuclear weapon security an important challenge. Sandia, using scientific and mathematic methodologies, is considered one of the world leaders in the design and implementation of physical protection systems (PPS) and VA methodology, in order to reduce the risk to both domestic and international high consequence facilities. Using the Presagis commercial software suite - primarily Scenario Toolkit and Generation Environment (STAGE), a complex simulation engine - the authors have developed a single analyst, Monte Carlo derived, agent decision-based, and event-driven interactive tool to help meet this need. Evaluating risk reduction for critical infrastructure against increasingly complex adversaries requires high fidelity VA modeling tools. Advanced adversary capabilities require modeling complex scenario variables, including multiple attack vectors and dynamically selected targets of opportunity. Large threat profiles with complex character behavior are needed for increasing adversary militancy. Coupled with Sandia methodology, the strength of the tool stems from the decision logic structure and built-in artificial intelligence components. STAGE allows for an inclusive command and control VA model that uses all traditional elements of a PPS (detection, communication, assessment, delay, command and control, response, interdiction, attrition, and neutralization). This paper will briefly describe the effect that the current threat environment has had on the VA process and then outline the role of STAGE in VA modeling and new threat reduction methodology. This paper also provides an update to the development of the STAGE tool, as well as a description of future plans to advance VA methodology and integrate STAGE simulation analysis with an existing physical site (the Integrated Security Facility at Sandia - a former Category I facility).