The problem of evil is one of the most difficult and protracted problems for the trio of Abrahamic faiths that uphold the classical conception of an “omni‐competent God”—omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. In its standard formulation in the literature, the existence or character of God is brought into direct contention with the existence of evil. One subset of this problem, reinvigorated by recent discussions within the intersection between the philosophy of religion and philosophy of science, is the evolutionary problem of evil or the “Darwinian problem of evil.” This article analyzes this subset of the evolutionary problem of evil hitherto unexplored in any depth within contemporary Islamic theology and proposes some possible evolutionary theodicies that Muslim theists can utilize based on core doctrines and other precepts of the Qur’ān as well as ideas developed within contemporary evolutionary theism and environmental ethics. In this way, the article offers a contribution to the currently small but growing body of theodicy literature within contemporary Islamic ethics and environmentalism.
Contemporary philosophers and epistemologists as well as scholars of Islamic studies have not failed to notice some striking similarities between aspects of the Islamic notion of the “fiṭra” (humanity’s archetypal nature) articulated by the medieval Hanbalī traditionalist jurist and theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d.728/1328) and the account of the sensus divinitatis (an innate, direct perception of God) espoused by the reformed philosopher Alvin Plantinga (1932–present). This article systematically compares both these notions and more by first situating them within the antecedent historical factors and developments leading up to their emergence in their respective intellectual milieu, the theological anthropology espoused by both thinkers and the religious epistemology of each respective thinker. The article will also discuss salient differences between each doctrine and their broader parent epistemologies and will examine major objections raised against them. The comparative study reveals not only a rich source of Islamic religious epistemology to be mined by diligent researchers but the exciting application of philosophical analysis to the thought of Ibn Taymiyya. Finally, the article argues that Ibn Taymiyya’s account of the fiṭra faces some problematic epistemological conundrums, one of which will be explored in detail.
This article is the first logical exploration of a major Islamic theological controversy regarding divine omnipotence (qudra) emerging in early 19th century northern India and persists today. The controversy involved two interconnected propositions. The first is known as ‘imkān-e naẓīr’, which is the proposition that God is able to create another identical Prophet Muḥammad. The second dubbed ‘ikmān-e kidhb’, is the possibility of God being able to lie or say untruths. The article will examine the arguments of two formidable scholars. The first is the one who detonated the controversy Shah Ismail Dihlawi (d. 1831) who argues for the possibility of God to actualise an identical Muḥammad and to lie and the second is his opponent and archnemesis Fazl-e Haqq Khayrabadi (d. 1861), who vehemently rejects both possibilities. The focus of the article is a detailed logical analysis of the structure and premises of the arguments as well as the core modal concepts assumed in the debate.
Human suffering is one of the most enduring realities that religious believers of all kinds continue to grapple with. Muslim thinkers too have pondered deeply over it, producing imaginative and novel ways to understand and explain this suffering. This article explores how theodicies – ways God’s justice and fairness are compatible with the existence of evil and suffering in the world – by themselves are not adequate to address suffering because of their theoretical nature. The proposal in this article is to adopt a meaning-making approach, one that allows the person suffering to construct meaning rather than have a theoretical solution imposed on them.