In this paper we will treat mereology as a theory of some structures that are not axiomatizable in an elementary language (one of the axioms will contain the predicate ‘belong’ (‘∈’) and we will use a variable ranging over the power set of the universe of the structure). A mereological structure is an ordered pair M = <M,⊑>, where M is a non-empty set and ⊑ is a binary relation in M, i.e., ⊑ is a subset of M × M. The relation ⊑ is a relation of being a mereological part (instead of ‘<x,y> ∈ ⊑’ we will write ‘x ⊑ y’ which will be read as “x is a part of y”). We formulate an axiomatization of mereological structures, different from Tarski’s axiomatization as presented in [10] (Tarski simplified Leśniewski’s axiomatization from [6]; cf. Remark 4). We prove that these axiomatizations are equivalent (see Theorem 1). Of course, these axiomatizations are definitionally equivalent to the very first axiomatization of mereology from [5], where the relation of being a proper part ⊏ is a primitive one. Moreover, we will show that Simons’ “Classical Extensional Mereology” from [9] is essentially weaker than Leśniewski’s mereology (cf. Remark 6).
This is the first, out of two papers, devoted to Andrzej Grzegorczyk’s point-free system of topology from Grzegorczyk (Synthese 12(2–3):228–235, 1960 . https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485101 ). His system was one of the very first fully fledged axiomatizations of topology based on the notions of region, parthood and separation (the dual notion of connection). Its peculiar and interesting feature is the definition of point, whose intention is to grasp our geometrical intuitions of points as systems of shrinking regions of space. In this part we analyze (quasi-)separation structures and Grzegorczyk structures, and establish their properties which will be useful in the sequel. We prove that in the class of Urysohn spaces with countable chain condition, to every topologically interpreted representative of a point in the sense of Grzegorczyk’s corresponds exactly one point of a space. We also demonstrate that Tychonoff first-countable spaces give rise to complete Grzegorczyk structures. The results established below will be used in the second part devoted to points and topological spaces.
In this paper we give probably an exhaustive analysis of the geometry of solids which was sketched by Tarski in his short paper [20, 21]. We show that in order to prove theorems stated in [20, 21] one must enrich Tarski's theory with a new postulate asserting that the universe of discourse of the geometry of solids coincides with arbitrary mereological sums of balls, i.e., with solids. We show that once having adopted such a solution Tarski's Postulate 4 can be omitted, together with its versions 4′ and 4″. We also prove that the equivalence of postulates 4, 4′ and 4″ is not provable in any theory whose domain contains objects other than solids. Moreover, we show that the concentricity relation as defined by Tarski must be transitive in the largest class of structures satisfying Tarski's axioms.We build a model (in three-dimensional Euclidean space) of the theory of so called T*-structures and present the proof of the fact that this is the only (up to isomorphism) model of this theory.Moreover, we propose different categorical axiomatizations of the geometry of solids. In the final part of the paper we answer the question concerning the logical status (within the theory of T*-structures) of the definition of the concentricity relation given by Tarski.
In the second installment to Gruszczyński and Pietruszczak (Stud Log, 2018 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-018-9786-8 ) we carry out an analysis of spaces of points of Grzegorczyk structures. At the outset we introduce notions of a concentric and \(\omega \)-concentric topological space and we recollect some facts proven in the first part which are important for the sequel. Theorem 2.9 is a strengthening of Theorem 5.13, as we obtain stronger conclusion weakening Tychonoff separation axiom to mere regularity. This leads to a stronger version of Theorem 6.10 (in form of Corollary 2.10). Further, we show that Grzegorczyk points are maximal contracting filters in the sense of De Vries (Compact spaces and compactifications, Van Gorcum and Comp. N.V., 1962 ), but the converse inclusion is not necessarily true. We also compare the notions of a Grzegorczyk point and an ultrafilter, and establish several properties of topological spaces based on Grzegorczyk structures. The main results of the paper are representation and completion theorems for G-structures. We prove both set-theoretical and topological representation theorems for various classes of G-structures. We also present topological object duality theorem for the class of complete G-structures and the class of concentric spaces, both restricted to structures which satisfy countable chain condition. We conclude the paper with proving equivalence of the original Grzegorczyk axiom with the one accepted by us as axiom (G).
In Jaśkowski’s model of discussion, discussive connectives represent certain interactions that can hold between debaters. However, it is not possible within the model for participants to use explicit modal operators. In the paper we present a modal extension of the discussive logic $\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$ that formally corresponds to an extended version of Jaśkowski’s model of discussion that permits such a use. This logic is denoted by $\textbf{m}\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$. We present philosophical motivations for the formulation of this logic. We also give syntactic characterizations of the logic and propose a comparison with certain other modal systems. In particular, we prove that $\textbf{m}\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$ is neither normal nor regular. On the basis of the axiomatization of $\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$, we give an axiomatization of $\textbf{m}\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$. We also give another axiomatization which is not based on the axiomatization of $\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$. Furthermore, we give a natural Kripke-style semantics for $\textbf{m}\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$ and prove the respective adequacy theorems.