Mohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia

Mohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 February 2025 in Science
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Journal Article
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SSSercan Sayin
Sercan Sayin
ECEinat Couzin-Fuchs
Einat Couzin-Fuchs
IPInga Petelski
Inga Petelski
YGYannick Günzel
Yannick Günzel
MOMohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
Mohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
ICIain D. Couzin
Iain D. Couzin
Collective motion, which is ubiquitous in nature, has traditionally been explained by “self-propelled particle” models from theoretical physics. Here we show, through field, lab, and virtual reality experimentation, that classical models of collective behavior cannot account for how collective motion emerges in marching desert locusts, whose swarms affect the livelihood of millions. In contrast to assumptions made by these models, locusts do not explicitly align with neighbors. While individuals respond to moving-dot stimuli through the optomotor response, this innate behavior does not mediate social response to neighbors. Instead, locust marching behavior, across scales, can be explained by a minimal cognitive framework, which incorporates individuals’ neural representation of bearings to neighbors and internal consensus dynamics for making directional choices. Our findings challenge long-held beliefs about how order can emerge from disorder in animal collectives.

6 August 2021 in PLOS ONE
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MOMohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
Mohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
A large body of empirical evidence suggests that altruistic punishment abounds in human societies. Based on such evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting cooperation in humans and possibly other species. However, as punishment is costly, its evolution is subject to the same problem that it tries to address. To suppress this so-called second-order free-rider problem, known theoretical models on the evolution of punishment resort to one of the few established mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. This leaves the question of whether altruistic punishment can evolve and give rise to the evolution of cooperation in the absence of such auxiliary cooperation-favoring mechanisms unaddressed. Here, by considering a population of individuals who play a public goods game, followed by a public punishing game, introduced here, we show that altruistic punishment indeed evolves and promotes cooperation in the absence of a cooperation-favoring mechanism. In our model, the punishment pool is considered a public resource whose resources are used for punishment. We show that the evolution of a punishing institution is facilitated when resources in the punishment pool, instead of being wasted, are used to reward punishers when there is nobody to punish. Besides, we show that higher returns to the public resource or punishment pool facilitate the evolution of prosocial instead of antisocial punishment. We also show that an optimal cost of investment in the punishment pool facilitates the evolution of prosocial punishment. Finally, our analysis shows that being close to a physical phase transition facilitates the evolution of altruistic punishment.

19 June 2019 in Scientific Reports
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MOMohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
Mohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
Two seemingly unrelated, but fundamental challenges in evolutionary theory, are the evolution of costly signals and costly cooperative traits, both expected to reduce an individual’s fitness and diminish by natural selection. Here, by considering a well mixed population of individuals who produce signals and decide on their strategies in a game they play, based on the signals, we show that costly signals and costly cooperative strategies can co-evolve as a result of internal dynamics of the system. Costly signals evolve, despite their apparent cost, due to a favorable cooperative response they elicit. This favorable strategic response can be quantified in a fitness term which governs the distribution of costly signals better than their apparent cost. In the same way, cooperative strategies evolve as they can reach a high fitness due to the internal dynamics of the systems.

6 August 2019 in Physical Review Letters
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MOMohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
Mohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
We consider a population of individuals living in an uncertain environment. Individuals are able to make noisy observations of the environment and communicate using signals. We show that the model shows an order-disorder transition from an ordered phase in low communication noise in which a consensus about the environmental state is formed to a disordered phase in high communication noise in which no consensus is formed. There are different consensus states: informed consensus in which consensus on the correct belief about the environmental state is formed, and misinformed consensus in which consensus on a wrong belief is formed. Based on the consensus state reached, the ordered phase is decomposed into multistable states separated by first order transitions. We show that the inference capability of the population in a changing environment is maximized on the edge of bistability: on the border between an informed consensus phase and a bistable phase in which both informed and misinformed consensuses are stable. In addition, we show that an optimal level of noise in communication increases the responsiveness of the population to environmental changes in a resonancelike phenomenon. Furthermore, the beneficial effect of noise is the most crucial in a fast changing environment.

8 February 2021 in PLOS Computational Biology
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MOMohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
Mohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
As cooperation incurs a cost to the cooperator for others to benefit, its evolution seems to contradict natural selection. How evolution has resolved this obstacle has been among the most intensely studied questions in evolutionary theory in recent decades. Here, we show that having a choice between different public resources provides a simple mechanism for cooperation to flourish. Such a mechanism can be at work in many biological or social contexts where individuals can form different groups or join different institutions to perform a collective action task, or when they can choose between collective actions with different profitability. As a simple evolutionary model suggests, defectors tend to join the highest quality resource in such a context. This allows cooperators to survive and out-compete defectors by sheltering in a lower quality resource. Cooperation is maximized, however, when the qualities of the two highest quality resources are similar, and thus, they are almost interchangeable.

29 November 2021 in Communications Biology
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MOMohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
Mohammad Salahshour Mehmandoust Olia
Public goods are often subject to heterogeneous costs, such as the necessary costs to maintain the public goods infrastructure. However, the extent to which heterogeneity in participation cost can affect groups’ ability to provide public goods is unclear. Here, by introducing a mathematical model, I show that when individuals face a costly institution and a free institution to perform a collective action task, the existence of a participation cost promotes cooperation in the costly institution. Despite paying for a participation cost, costly cooperators, who join the costly institution and cooperate, can outperform defectors who predominantly join a free institution. This promotes cooperation in the costly institution and can facilitate the evolution of cooperation in the free institution. For small profitability of the collective action, cooperation in a costly institution but not the free institution evolves. However, individuals are doomed to a winnerless red queen dynamics in which cooperators are unable to suppress defection. For large profitabilities, cooperation in both the costly and the free institution evolves. In this regime, cooperators with different game preferences complement each other to efficiently suppress defection in a black queen dynamic.