We hypothesize that citreoviridin (CIT) induces DNA damage in human liver-derived HepG2 cells through an oxidative stress mechanism and that N-acetyl-l-cysteine (NAC) protects against CIT-induced DNA damage in HepG2 cells. CIT-induced DNA damage in HepG2 cells was evaluated by alkaline single-cell gel electrophoresis assay. To elucidate the genotoxicity mechanisms, the level of oxidative DNA damage was tested by immunoperoxidase staining for 8-hydroxydeoxyguanosine (8-OHdG); the intracellular generation of reactive oxygen species (ROS) and reduced glutathione (GSH) were examined; mitochondrial membrane potential and lysosomal membranes' permeability were detected; furthermore, protective effects of NAC on CIT-induced ROS formation and CIT-induced DNA damage were evaluated in HepG2 cells. A significant dose-dependent increment in DNA migration was observed at tested concentrations (2.50–10.00 µM) of CIT. The levels of ROS, 8-OHdG formation were increased by CIT, and significant depletion of GSH in HepG2 cells was induced by CIT. Destabilization of lysosome and mitochondria was also observed in cells treated with CIT. In addition, NAC significantly decreased CIT-induced ROS formation and CIT-induced DNA damage in HepG2 cells. The data indicate that CIT induces DNA damage in HepG2 cells, most likely through oxidative stress mechanisms; that NAC protects against DNA damage induced by CIT in HepG2 cells; and that depolarization of mitochondria and lysosomal protease leakage may play a role in CIT-induced DNA damage in HepG2 cells. © 2014 The Authors. Published by Wiley Periodicals Inc. Environ Toxicol 30: 530–537, 2015.

Wetland ecosystems have suffered serious damage. To increase the incentive to protect wetlands, the government can allocate certain carbon emission allowances to environmental organizations that protect wetlands. Common wetland governance modes include restoring water quantity, diversifying vegetation and controlling invasive species. In order to derive the applicable range of various wetland governance modes, this article constructs three differential game models and compares and analyzes the equilibrium results obtained by the models. Finally, the research shows that if the additional reputation gained by restoring water quantity per unit is small, the government can achieve the maximum benefit by choosing the restoring water quantity mode. If the additional reputation gained by restoring water quantity per unit is large, the government can achieve the maximum benefit by choosing the diversifying vegetation mode. Due to the existence of carbon trading, environmental organizations will take wetland ecosystem protection measures. If the additional reputation gained by restoring water quantity per unit is small and the revenue gained by governing wetlands per unit is large, the environmental organizations can achieve the maximum benefit by choosing the controlling invasive species mode. Otherwise, the environmental organizations can achieve the maximum benefit by choosing the diversifying vegetation mode.

In recent years, wetland ecosystems have faced severe degradation, prompting governments to provide carbon compensations to enterprises engaged in wetland conservation efforts. The relationships between governments and enterprises in wetland management are primarily categorized into three models: mission relationships, employment relationships, and alliance relationships. Determining the optimal application scope for each model remains a critical challenge. To address this, this paper constructs three differential game models and conducts a comparative analysis of their equilibrium outcomes. The findings reveal distinct optimal scenarios for governments and enterprises. For governments, the employment relationships model maximizes social benefit when the per-unit benefit of wetland management is small; the mission relationships model is optimal for moderate benefits, and the alliance relationships model for large benefits. For enterprises, the employment relationships model maximizes social benefit when the per-unit benefit is small; the alliance relationships model is optimal for moderate benefits, and the mission relationships model for large benefits.

In recent years, forest pests and diseases have had a significant impact on forest ecosystems. To incentivize corporations to manage forest pests and diseases, the government provides certain carbon compensations to enterprises involved in this management. In the process of controlling forest pests and diseases, the modes of collaboration between the government and corporations are primarily categorized into three modes: independent action, scarce resource sharing, and information sharing. To determine the applicability of each relational mode, this paper constructs three differential game models and compares and analyzes the equilibrium results obtained from these modes. The research indicates that if the cost of government-managed forest pest and disease control is high and the benefits of such control are low, then the scarce resource sharing mode can offer the government the maximum benefit; conversely, the information sharing mode can provide the government with the greatest benefit. If the cost and benefits of corporate-managed forest pest and disease control are low, then the information sharing mode can offer corporations the maximum benefit; otherwise, the scarce resource sharing mode can provide corporations with the greatest benefit.

The escalating frequency and scale of global forest fires, exacerbated by climate change and human activities, present a critical challenge to ecosystem stability and public safety. Traditional forest fire management often suffers from inefficient resource allocation and inadequate risk mitigation due to its failure to systematically address inherent systemic biases and uncertainties. The purpose of this study is to investigate how three fundamental principles—Murphy’s Law, Parkinson’s Law, and the Pareto Principle—influence the effectiveness of collaborative forest fire management from a risk analysis perspective. Methodologically, the study employs a differential game theory framework to model the strategic interactions between government agencies and environmental organizations, incorporating risk assessment parameters. The key findings reveal that the strategic approach of stakeholders is highly sensitive to the perceived benefits of collaboration. Specifically, government agencies tend to adopt strategies aligned with the Pareto Principle when collaboration benefits are low, focusing on critical priorities, but shift towards behaviors reflective of Parkinson’s Law when benefits are high, potentially leading to resource expansion and inefficiency. In contrast, environmental organizations consistently demonstrate management approaches that adhere to the Pareto Principle. The study concludes that explicitly accounting for these behavioral principles is crucial for designing robust collaborative mechanisms. The primary contribution and novelty of this research lie in the original integration of these well-known sociological and management principles into a formal analytical model for disaster management. This novel framework provides a valuable tool for policymakers to anticipate stakeholder behavior, optimize resource deployment, and enhance the overall resilience of forest fire management systems against unforeseen risks.