Previous studies on the relationship between government debt and economic growth have produced very diverse findings. This study examines the relationship between public debt and economic growth in developing countries using a quantile regression approach with fixed effects and bootstrapping on the 10% to 90% quantile distribution. The quantile grouping is based on specific percentiles of economic growth in developing countries. This study uses panel data from 127 developing countries for the period 2012 to 2019. Data were obtained from the World Development Indicators, the World Bank, and Transparency International. The results of this study indicate that public debt is not friendly to economic growth. Public debt actually hinders economic growth in developing countries, especially in the 30% to 90% quantile. Other factors that influence economic growth in developing countries are trade, inflation rates, government spending, corruption, and net foreign direct investment. Trade and net direct investment significantly increase economic growth in developing countries. Meanwhile, public debt, the inflation rate, government spending, and corruption actually inhibit economic growth in developing countries. On the other hand, education spending, private debt, tax revenues, and labor force participation do not contribute significantly to economic growth in developing countries. These findings confirm that public debt governance and governance are very important in driving economic growth in developing countries. This paper provides empirical and policy contributions to the assessment of institutional effectiveness in relation to the impact of public debt management on economic growth in developing countries.

The implementation of a deposit insurance scheme entails a trade off. On one hand, as shown in theoretical and empirical studies, a deposit insurance scheme reduces the likelihood of a bank run. On the other hand, a deposit insurance scheme induces moral hazard among bankers that may lead to bank failures. We rigorously test the effect of different deposit coverage limit and the implementation of a differential premium treatment on bankers’ behaviors in the deposit and credit market. We do so by designing a laboratory experiment that involves real bankers as participants. We find that the coverage limit treatments do not have any effect on deposit rate offer. Nevertheless, we find that a high deposit coverage limit induces smaller banks to have a higher share of risky projects. This is evidence of moral hazard particularly among small banks.

Introduction/ Main Objectives: This study investigates whether relaxing the assumption of the non-anonymity of participants in an experiment of a finitely repeated public-good game with randomly matched players affects the intuitiveness of prosocial behavior. Background Problems: Various studies show that, in general, participants of social dilemma game experiments tend to be intuitive in choosing prosocial behaviour, whereas non-cooperative behavior tends to be slow. Other studies show that experiments which induced the non-anonymity of participants promote prosocial behavior, however, these studies did not impose non-anonymity on the participants. Novelty: This study aims to fill the literature gap on whether introducing non-anonymity of participants in a social dilemma game experiment may affect the intuitiveness of prosocial behavior. Research Methods: This study used a laboratory experiment of finitely repeated public-good games with randomly matched players in each stage. The main difference between the control and the treatment groups lay in the anonymity of participants in the interaction, where participants in treatment group are exposed to the photo of their opponent. Finding/Results: The results show that relaxing the anonymity setting improved the participants’ contributions to the public-good game; however, their prosocial behavior became less intuitive than non-cooperative behavior. Conclusion: This paper demonstrated an attempt to fill the gap in the literature between the intuitiveness of prosocial behaviour and the role of identity in prosocial behavior.