Sarah Joanne Lindop

Dr. Sarah Joanne Lindop

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2013 in International Review of Financial Analysis
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CNCollins Ntim
Collins Ntim
SLSarah Joanne Lindop
Sarah Joanne Lindop
DTDennis A. Thomas
Dennis A. Thomas

30 January 2017 in The International Journal of Human Resource Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CNCollins Ntim
Collins Ntim
SLSarah Joanne Lindop
Sarah Joanne Lindop
DTDennis A. Thomas
Dennis A. Thomas
HAHussein A. Abdou
Hussein A. Abdou
KOKwaku K. Opong
Kwaku K. Opong
This paper examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and corporate governance (CG) structure can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a large up-to-date South African data-set. Our findings are threefold. First, when direct links between executive pay and performance are examined, we find a positive, but relatively small PPS. Second, our results show that in a context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier agency conflict (director monitoring power and opportunism) is stronger than the first-tier agency problem (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional analysis suggests that CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on the PPS. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful and long-tenured CEOs. Overall, our evidence sheds new important theoretical and empirical insights on explaining the PPS with specific focus on the predictions of the optimal contracting and managerial power hypotheses. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, pay, and performance proxies.

18 October 2013 in Managerial and Decision Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
CNCollins Ntim
Collins Ntim
SLSarah Joanne Lindop
Sarah Joanne Lindop
KOKofi A. Osei
Kofi A. Osei
DTDennis A. Thomas
Dennis A. Thomas

Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AAAbdullah Aldousari
Abdullah Aldousari
AMAhmed Mohammed
Ahmed Mohammed
SLSarah Joanne Lindop
Sarah Joanne Lindop
This study explores the ownership–risk relationship in the GCC emerging economies during the COVID-19 pandemic, examining 44 commercial banks classified as private and publicly owned banks. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) method is employed to identify endogeneity issues, with robustness checks using panel data techniques. We analyzed the ownership–risk relationship, including non-linear and interaction effects. The results reveal that public ownership exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with NPLs, where moderate public concentration increases credit risk, while high public control marginally reduces it. Private ownership is linked to higher risk once bank-specific characteristics are controlled, reflecting riskier lending driven by profitability motives. We show that public banks demonstrate resilience due to stable deposits and implicit backing, whereas private banks are more vulnerable to systemic shocks. The impact of ownership structure on credit risk is context-dependent, reflecting heterogeneous ownership objectives in the GCC.

Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AAAbdullah Aldousari
Abdullah Aldousari
AMAhmed Mohammed
Ahmed Mohammed
SLSarah Joanne Lindop
Sarah Joanne Lindop
This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure (foreign and domestic) and bank risk-taking over the period 2014–2022. The analysis includes 66 banks operating in the GCC, divided into 44 domestically owned, and 22 foreign-owned banks. The research examines the relationship across two distinct periods: the pre-pandemic and the COVID-19 pandemic era, using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method, and panel data techniques for robust analysis. The findings reveal that, in both periods, foreign-owned banks exhibited lower credit risk, greater cost efficiency, and less risk-taking compared to domestic counterparts. Domestic banks, while maintaining profitability, relied heavily on capital absorbency, which resulted in elevated credit risk and operational inefficiencies. These inefficiencies, observed among domestic banks, stem from inadequate monitoring of borrowers’ information and the occurrence of moral hazard. Foreign banks played a crucial role in supporting banking sector stability, as their presence enhanced the GDP growth. The results are in line with the “global advantage hypothesis”.

14 September 2021 in Abacus
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KHKevin Holland
Kevin Holland
SLSarah Joanne Lindop
Sarah Joanne Lindop
NWNor Shaipah Abdul Wahab
Nor Shaipah Abdul Wahab
Corporate finance decisions, measurement of accounting profits, and market valuations are invariably made within the framework of a taxation system(s). Previous research indicates both ambiguity over the influence of taxation on managers’ behaviour and limitations in the ability of shareholders to process tax information. The establishment of the UK's Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) regime in 2006 allowed quoted companies to opt out of company level taxation. We examine managers’ and shareholders’ responses, that is, their ability to process information. When compared with shareholders, managers demonstrated a greater knowledge of the legislation, and of its applicability. For example, managers appeared to pre‐empt the effects of the legislation. Our findings have implications for tax policy makers and taxpayers, acting as a warning of the potential downside of increased cooperation when trying to make more appropriately formed legislation. Further, managers appeared to be willing to trade off the interests of shareholders for their own personal gain, which is surprising given the visibility of the REIT conversion process and illustrates the limitations of shareholder control over managers’ behaviour. We find shareholders were able to accurately assess the general effects of the legislation but were unable to identify specific companies likely to benefit. Without any increase in shareholder sophistication, concerns exist over the effectiveness of shareholders in acting as monitors of managers’ decision making.