In this study, a new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasitic voltage-source in the loop. Relevant situations often exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication is over a distance, or between different units within an instrument, due to a ground loop and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI). Our present study investigates the DC ground loop situation when no AC or EMI effects are present. Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage comparison-based defense method that exposes active attacks or parasitic features (such as wire resistance allowing information leaks) does not function here. The attack is successfully demonstrated and proposed defense methods against the attack are shown.
A new attack against the Kirchhoff Law Johnson Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system is studied with unknown parasitic DC voltage sources at both Alices and Bobs ends. This paper is the generalization of our earlier investigation with a single end parasitic source. Under the assumption that Eve does not know the values of the parasitic sources, a new attack, utilizing the current generated by the parasitic dc voltage sources, is introduced. The attack is mathematically analyzed and demonstrated by computer simulations. Simple defense methods against the attack are shown. The earlier defense method based solely on the comparison of current/voltage data at Alice's and Bob's terminals is useless here since the wire currents and voltages are equal at both ends. However, the more expensive version of the earlier defense method, which is based on in situ system simulation and comparison with measurements, works efficiently.
A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasitic dc-voltage-source in the loop. Relevant situations often exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication is over a distance, due to a ground loop and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI). Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage comparison based defense method that exposes active attacks or parasitic features (such as wire resistance allowing information leak) does not function here. The attack is successfully demonstrated. Proposed defense methods against it are shown.
This study addresses a new question regarding the security of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) scheme compromised by DC sources at Alice and Bob: What is the impact of these parasitic sources on active attacks, such as the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, or the current injection attack? The surprising answer is that the parasitic DC sources actually increase the security of the system because, in the case of the MITM attack, they make easier to uncover the eavesdropping. In some of the cases Eve can fix this deficiency but then the problem gets reduced to the original MITM attack to which the KLJN scheme is immune, it is already as proven earlier
A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is introduced. The attack is based on 1) Utilizing the dc-voltage-source - which we put at Alice’s end in our mathematical modeling of the attack-that could exist due to errors, imbalances, Electromagnetic interference and etc.2) On studying the number of samples per bit in the security key that the measured Alice/Bob voltages exceeds or falls below a threshold voltage, respectively. The threshold voltage is the average between dc voltages across low and high resistors- generated by a dc-voltage source. We count the number of samples the voltage at Bob’s end (containing both the noise and dc components) exceeds the threshold voltage and how many times it falls below the threshold to judge whether the resistor can be guessed as low or high for every cycle. Also for a pre-specified key-length we count the number of high resistance estimations per bit –at Bob’s end-according to the previous criterion and the non-successful estimations per bit to judge the final guessed resistor value at Alice’s end and Bob’s end, where if we have more bits with most of its measured samples are above the threshold voltage then we will predict Bob’s resistance as high resistance, otherwise we predict Bob’s resistance to be low resistance. The Simulation was conducted and the attack proved that it is successful unless the temperature increased dramatically to ranges more than a threshold temperature ~ Kelvin that increases when the number of samples per bit increases.