We present the rationale and design of S-Net, a coordination language for asynchronous stream processing. The language achieves a near-complete separation between the application code, written in any conventional programming language, and the coordination/communication code written in S-Net. Our approach supports a component technology with flexible software reuse. No extension of the conventional language is required. The interface between S-Net and the application code is in terms of one additional library function. The application code is componentised and presented to S-Net as a set of components, called boxes, each encapsulating a single tuple-to-tuple function. Apart from the boxes defined using an external compute language, S-Net features two built-in boxes: one for network housekeeping and one for data-flow style synchronisation. Streaming network composition under S-Net is based on four network combinators, which have both deterministic and nondeterministic versions. Flexible software reuse is comprehensive, with the box interfaces and even the network structure being subject to subtyping. We propose an inheritance mechanism, named flow inheritance, that is specifically geared towards stream processing. The paper summarises the essential language constructs and type concepts and gives a short application example.
We propose a two-layered approach for exploiting different forms of concurrency in complex systems: we specify computational components in our functional array language SAC, which exploits data parallel properties of array processing code. The declarative stream processing language S-Net is used to orchestrate the collaborative behaviour of these components in a streaming network. We illustrate our approach by a hybrid implementation of a sudoku puzzle solver as a representative for more complex search problems.
This paper proposes an architecture and a protocol suite for a permissioned blockchain for a local IoT network. The architecture is based on a sealed Sequencer and a Fog Server running (post-quantum) Guy Fawkes protocols. The blocks of the blockchain are stored in networked Content Addressable Storage alongside any user data and validity proofs. We maintain that a typical IoT device can, despite its resource limitations, use our blockchain protocols directly, without a trusted intermediary. This includes posting and monitoring transactions as well as off-chain (post-quantum) emergency communications without an explicit public key.
This paper studies known indexing structures from a new point of view: minimisation of data exchange between an IoT device acting as a blockchain client and the blockchain server running a protocol suite that includes two Guy Fawkes protocols, PLS and SLVP. The PLS blockchain is not a cryptocurrency instrument; it is an immutable ledger offering guaranteed non-repudiation to low-power clients without use of public key crypto. The novelty of the situation is in the fact that every PLS client has to obtain a proof of absence in all blocks of the chain to which its counterparty does not contribute, and we show that it is possible without traversing the block’s Merkle tree. We obtain weight statistics of a leaf path on a sparse Merkle tree theoretically, as our ground case. Using the theory we quantify the communication cost of a client interacting with the blockchain. We show that large savings can be achieved by providing a bitmap index of the tree compressed using Tunstall’s method. We further show that even in the case of correlated access, as in two IoT devices posting messages for each other in consecutive blocks, it is possible to prevent compression degradation by re-randomising the IDs using a pseudorandom bijective function. We propose a low-cost function of this kind and evaluate its quality by simulation, using the avalanche criterion.
This paper proposes and evaluates a new bipartite post-quantum digital signature protocol based on Winternitz chains and an oracle. Mutually mistrustful Alice and Bob are able to agree and sign a series of documents in a way that makes it impossible (within the assumed security model) to repudiate their signatures. The number of signatures supported by a single public key is still limited, though by a large number. However, the security of the signature scheme is not diminished by repeated application, so when the capacity of a public key is exhausted the last transaction can be used to agree a new key. Some ramifications are discussed, security parameters evaluated and an application area delineated for the proposed concept.