In this paper, the problem of random access contention between machine type devices (MTDs) in the uplink of a wireless cellular network is studied. In particular, the possibility of forming cooperative groups to coordinate the MTDs' requests for the random access channel (RACH) is analyzed. The problem is formulated as a stochastic coalition formation game in which the MTDs are the players that seek to form cooperative coalitions to optimize a utility function that captures each MTD's energy consumption and time-varying queue length. Within each coalition, an MTD acts as a coalition head that sends the access requests of the coalition members over the RACH. One key feature of this game is its ability to cope with stochastic environments in which the arrival requests of MTDs and the packet success rate over RACH are dynamically time-varying. The proposed stochastic coalitional game is composed of multiple stages, each of which corresponds to a coalitional game in stochastic characteristic form that is played by the MTDs at each time step. To solve this game, a novel distributed coalition formation algorithm is proposed and shown to converge to a stable MTD partition. Simulation results show that, on the average, the proposed stochastic coalition formation algorithm can reduce the average fail ratio and energy consumption of up to 36% and 31% for a cluster-based distribution of MTDs, respectively, compared with a noncooperative case. Moreover, when the MTDs are more sensitive to the energy consumption (queue length), the coalitions' size will increase (decrease).

The significantly high energy consumption of data centers constitutes a major load on the smart power grid. Data center demand response is a promising solution to incentivize the cloud providers to adapt their consumption to the power grid conditions. These policies not only mitigate the operational stability issues of the smart grid but also potentially decrease the electricity bills of cloud providers. Cloud providers can improve their contribution and reduce their energy cost by collaboratively managing their workload. Through cooperation in the form of cloud federations, providers can spatially migrate their workload to better utilize the benefits provided by demand response schemes over multiple locations. To this end, this work considers an interaction system between the independent cloud providers and the corresponding smart grid utilities in the context of a demand response program. Leveraging the cooperative game theory, this paper presents a federation formation among the cloud providers in the presence of a location-dependent demand response program. A distributed algorithm that is coupled with an optimal workload allocation problem is applied. The effect of the federation's formation on the clouds' profits and on the smart grid performance is analyzed through simulation. Simulation results show that cooperation increases the clouds' profits as well as the smart grid performance compared to the noncooperative case.

In this paper, a novel framework for optimizing the caching of popular user content at the level of wireless user equipments (UEs) is proposed. The goal is to improve content offloading over wireless device-to-device (D2D) communications. To model the collaborative effect of a set of UEs on content offloading, a cooperative game between the UEs is formulated. For this game, it is shown that the Shapley value (SV) of each UE effectively captures the impact of this UE on the overall content offloading process. To capture the presence of multiple social communities that connect the UEs, a hypergraph model is proposed. Two line graphs are developed for analyzing the proposed hypergaph model. Using the developed line graphs along with the SV of the cooperative game, a precise offloading power metric is derived for each UE within a multi-community, multi-hop D2D network. Then, UEs with high offloading power are chosen as the optimal locations for caching the popular content. Simulation results show that, on the average, the proposed cache placement framework achieves 12%, 19% and 21% improvements in terms of the number of UEs that received offloaded popular content compared to the schemes based on betweenness, degree, and closeness centrality, respectively.

Committee-based permissionless blockchain approaches overcome single leader consensus protocols’ scalability issues by partitioning the outstanding transaction set into shards and selecting multiple committees to process these transactions in parallel. However, by design, shard-based blockchain solutions are vulnerable to Sybil attacks. An adversary with enough computational/hash power can easily manipulate the consensus protocol by generating multiple valid node identifiers/IDs (i.e., multiple Sybil committee members).Despite the straightforward nature of these attacks, they have not been systematically investigated. This article fills this research gap by analyzing Sybil attacks in shard-based consensus of proof-of-work blockchain systems. Specifically, we provide a detailed analysis for Elastico, one of the prominent shard-based blockchain models. We show that the proof-of-work technique used for ID generation in the initial phase of such protocols is vulnerable to Sybil attacks when an adversary (could be a group of colluding nodes) possesses enough hash power. We analytically derive conditions for two different Sybil attacks and perform numerical simulations to validate our theoretical results under various parameters. Further, we utilize the BlockSim simulator to validate our mathematical computation, and results confirm the correctness of the analysis.