In this paper, we show that solutions to ordinary differential equations describing the large-population limits of Markovian stochastic epidemic models can be interpreted as survival or cumulative hazard functions when analysing data on individuals sampled from the population. We refer to the individual-level survival and hazard functions derived from population-level equations as a survival dynamical system (SDS). To illustrate how population-level dynamics imply probability laws for individual-level infection and recovery times that can be used for statistical inference, we show numerical examples based on synthetic data. In these examples, we show that an SDS analysis compares favourably with a complete-data maximum-likelihood analysis. Finally, we use the SDS approach to analyse data from a 2009 influenza A(H1N1) outbreak at Washington State University.
1 June 2022 in Journal of The Royal Society Interface
We present a new method for analysing stochastic epidemic models under minimal assumptions. The method, dubbed dynamic survival analysis (DSA), is based on a simple yet powerful observation, namely that population-level mean-field trajectories described by a system of partial differential equations may also approximate individual-level times of infection and recovery. This idea gives rise to a certain non-Markovian agent-based model and provides an agent-level likelihood function for a random sample of infection and/or recovery times. Extensive numerical analyses on both synthetic and real epidemic data from foot-and-mouth disease in the UK (2001) and COVID-19 in India (2020) show good accuracy and confirm the method’s versatility in likelihood-based parameter estimation. The accompanying software package gives prospective users a practical tool for modelling, analysing and interpreting epidemic data with the help of the DSA approach.
Background: As of April 2, 2020, the global reported number of COVID-19 cases has crossed over 1 million with more than 55,000 deaths. The household transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2, the causative pathogen, remains elusive. Methods: Based on a comprehensive contact-tracing dataset from Guangzhou, we estimated both the population-level effective reproductive number and individual-level secondary attack rate (SAR) in the household setting. We assessed age effects on transmissibility and the infectivity of COVID-19 cases during their incubation period. Results: A total of 195 unrelated clusters with 212 primary cases, 137 nonprimary (secondary or tertiary) cases and 1938 uninfected close contacts were traced. We estimated the household SAR to be 13.8% (95% CI: 11.1-17.0%) if household contacts are defined as all close relatives and 19.3% (95% CI: 15.5-23.9%) if household contacts only include those at the same residential address as the cases, assuming a mean incubation period of 4 days and a maximum infectious period of 13 days. The odds of infection among children (<20 years old) was only 0.26 (95% CI: 0.13-0.54) times of that among the elderly (≥60 years old). There was no gender difference in the risk of infection. COVID-19 cases were at least as infectious during their incubation period as during their illness. On average, a COVID-19 case infected 0.48 (95% CI: 0.39-0.58) close contacts. Had isolation not been implemented, this number increases to 0.62 (95% CI: 0.51-0.75). The effective reproductive number in Guangzhou dropped from above 1 to below 0.5 in about 1 week. Conclusion: SARS-CoV-2 is more transmissible in households than SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, and the elderly ≥60 years old are the most vulnerable to household transmission. Case finding and isolation alone may be inadequate to contain the pandemic and need to be used in conjunction with heightened restriction of human movement as implemented in Guangzhou.
As the Coronavirus 2019 disease (COVID-19) started to spread rapidly in the state of Ohio, the Ecology, Epidemiology and Population Health (EEPH) program within the Infectious Diseases Institute (IDI) at The Ohio State University (OSU) took the initiative to offer epidemic modeling and decision analytics support to the Ohio Department of Health (ODH). This paper describes the methodology used by the OSU/IDI response modeling team to predict statewide cases of new infections as well as potential hospital burden in the state. The methodology has two components: (1) A Dynamical Survival Analysis (DSA)-based statistical method to perform parameter inference, statewide prediction and uncertainty quantification. (2) A geographic component that down-projects statewide predicted counts to potential hospital burden across the state. We demonstrate the overall methodology with publicly available data. A Python implementation of the methodology is also made publicly available. This manuscript was submitted as part of a theme issue on "Modelling COVID-19 and Preparedness for Future Pandemics".
The household secondary attack risk (SAR), often called the secondary attack rate or secondary infection risk, is the probability of infectious contact from an infectious household memberAto a given household memberB, where we define infectious contact to be a contact sufficient to infectBif he or she is susceptible. Estimation of the SAR is an important part of understanding and controlling the transmission of infectious diseases. In practice, it is most often estimated using binomial models such as logistic regression, which implicitly attribute all secondary infections in a household to the primary case. In the simplest case, the number of secondary infections in a household withmsusceptibles and a single primary case is modeled as a binomial(m,p) random variable wherepis the SAR. Although it has long been understood that transmission within households is not binomial, it is thought that multiple generations of transmission can be neglected safely whenpis small. We use probability generating functions and simulations to show that this is a mistake. The proportion of susceptible household members infected can be substantially larger than the SAR even whenpis small. As a result, binomial estimates of the SAR are biased upward and their confidence intervals have poor coverage probabilities even if adjusted for clustering. Accurate point and interval estimates of the SAR can be obtained using longitudinal chain binomial models or pairwise survival analysis, which account for multiple generations of transmission within households, the ongoing risk of infection from outside the household, and incomplete follow-up. We illustrate the practical implications of these results in an analysis of household surveillance data collected by the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health during the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic.
Although COVID-19 vaccines are widely available in the U.S. and much of the world, many have chosen to forgo this vaccination. Emergency medical services (EMS) professionals, despite their role on the frontlines and interactions with COVID-positive patients, are not immune to vaccine hesitancy. Via a survey conducted in April 2021, we investigated the extent to which first responders in the U.S. trusted various information sources to provide reliable information about COVID-19 vaccines. Those vaccinated generally trusted healthcare providers as a source of information, but unvaccinated first responders had fairly low trust in this information source—a group to which they, themselves, belong. Additionally, regardless of vaccination status, trust in all levels of government, employers, and their community as sources of information was low. Free-response explanations provided some context to these findings, such as preference for other COVID-19 management options, including drugs proven ineffective. A trusted source of COVID-19 vaccination information is not readily apparent. Individuals expressed a strong desire for the autonomy to make vaccination decisions for themselves, as opposed to mandates. Potential reasons for low trust, possible solutions to address them, generalizability to the broader public, and implications of low trust in official institutions are discussed.