Frey and Osborne (2017), estimated that there is a 94 percent probability that automation will replace accountants and auditors. The leading accounting firms are concerned that a tech company like Google could enter and disrupt the auditing industry. In response, they are themselves investing in artificial intelligence and other technologies. Two key questions need to be answered when automating audits: What is the role played by technology, whether client or auditor owned, in the audit process? And how will the use of that technology impact trust in audited financial statements, recognizing that trust is the rationale for auditing in the first place? We develop a framework for the audit process as an affective work system that takes into account that technology is both a production input and an affective mechanism shaping the level of trust consumers of the audited financial statements have in the audit process that assured those statements.
21 November 2006 in Journal of Information Systems and Technology Management
Continuous Auditing, broadly defined as the transformation of internal and external auditing through the application of modern information technology, is being increasingly adopted by firms throughout the world. Organizations ranging from Siemens, HCA, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, BIPOP Bank and the Internal Revenue Service are developing tools and practices that will bring assurance closer to the transaction and reduce through automation, the cost of auditing. A June 2006 PricewaterhouseCoopers survey finds that 50% of U.S. companies now use continuous auditing techniques and 31% percent of the rest have already made plans to follow suit. In this article we introduce the concepts of CA to a Brazilian audience and discuss its further application there. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4301/s1807-17752006000200007
1 February 2005 in International Journal of Disclosure and Governance
MNMichael G. AllesRutgers, The State University of New JerseyGlen L. GrayCalifornia State University, Northridge
Michael G. AllesRutgers, The State University of New JerseyGlen L. GrayCalifornia State University, Northridge
JBJ. Efrim Boritz
J. Efrim Boritz
WNWon Gyun No
Won Gyun No
QLQi Liu
Qi Liu
+4
There has been much discussion in the academic literature and in the XBRL community on the role of audit firms in providing assurance services for XBRL filings, especially now that the use of XBRL has been mandated in the United States. This paper presents the development of a framework of the demand for external assurance of XBRL filings predicated on two relative cost arguments. First, that in the absence of a mandate for XBRL filings to be assured by an external auditor, a manager will compare the cost of obtaining external assurance against the cost of obtaining confidence on the filings internally. Second, managers will be reluctant to pay more for external assurance on an XBRL filing than they paid to prepare it. The former is called the external cost relative to internal cost comparison, and the latter the external cost relative to preparation cost comparison. Based on our relative cost framework, it is predicted that there will only be a role for externally provided assurance of XBRL filings if the cost of that assurance can be either reduced or appear less significant to clients. The former outcome can be brought about by shifting assurance from the XBRL filings themselves to assurance of the preparer through a SSAE No. 16/SAS No. 70 report, thereby converting the cost of XBRL assurance from a variable cost to a fixed cost that is spread among many filers. External auditors can also attempt to make the cost of XBRL assurance less salient to managers by folding that cost into their total audit fees.
1 March 2004 in International Journal of Disclosure and Governance