Under China’s dual urban-rural land ownership system, the unequal legal status of collective and state-owned land hinders the realization of “equal rights and equal prices” for both. This paper analyz ed the impact of ownership on construction land prices using micro -level land transaction data from Wujin District, Changzhou City from 2015 to 2021 , and investigate d the role of government decision-making in this relationship. The results show that collective ownership has a negative impact on land prices , and the development of adjacent COCL has a positive impact on land prices. Besides, t he planning scope of downtown areas determined by spatial planning enhanc es the negative impact of collective ownership on land prices , thus widen ing the price gap between state and collective-owned land within the downtown areas . Furthermore, t he proportion of COCL in the annual land supply determined by land supply plan strengthens the negative impact of collective ownership on land prices , meaning that a increase in COCL supply lead s to further downward pressure on land price s . This study can provide insights for policy-making aiming to achiev e “equal rights and equal prices” for land of different ownership in China and in other countries with a dual land ownership system.
1 December 2025 in China Public Administration Review
This paper investigates whether reform of budget performance management can enhance the quality of budget execution, and it examines the mediating role of fiscal pressures in this relationship. Using panel data from 30 provincial governments over the period from 2000 to 2021, the research employs a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) model to assess the direct impact of the reform on the quality of budget execution. The quality of budget execution is comprehensively measured by three dimensions: execution progress, budget deviation, and the surplus ratio, which are transformed and combined into a unified index. The key explanatory variable is the implementation of the reform of budget performance management, operationalized through a policy intervention indicator. Fiscal pressures, quantified as the ratio of the difference between general public expenditures and revenue to revenue, are introduced as a mediating variable. The empirical results indicate that the reform significantly improves the quality of budget execution. The analysis reveals that, by setting clear performance targets and enhancing continuous monitoring, the reform not only directly enhances the execution outcomes but also indirectly contributes by alleviating the fiscal pressures. Reduced fiscal pressures, in turn, facilitate more effective budget execution, as governments under less financial strain can avoid overly restrictive fiscal policies that often compromise expenditure quality. Additional tests, including parallel trend assessments and robustness checks using kernel matching in propensity score matching (PSM), confirm the validity of the findings. The study also uncovers notable regional heterogeneity: the reform's effects are most pronounced in the central regions, followed by the western areas, while the impact in the eastern provinces is less significant. Furthermore, the reform's efficacy appears to be influenced by the professional backgrounds of the local government leaders; provinces led by officials with expertise in economics or finance experience more substantial improvements in the quality of budget execution. The paper concludes that integrating reform of budget performance management into fiscal governance frameworks can optimize resource allocations, improve expenditure efficiency, and enhance overall fiscal discipline. It also suggests that further refinements of performance targets and the effective application of performance evaluations are crucial for sustaining improvements in the quality of budget execution. The limitations of this study are due to the focus on provincial-level data, suggesting that for a more granular understanding future research should extend the analysis to the municipal and county levels.