Alternative hosts and model animals: The severe acute respiratory syndrome–coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic may have originated in bats, but how it made its way into humans is unknown. Because of its zoonotic origins, SARS-CoV-2 is unlikely to exclusively infect humans, so it would be valuable to have an animal model for drug and vaccine development. Shi et al. tested ferrets, as well as livestock and companion animals of humans, for their susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 (see the Perspective by Lakdawala and Menachery). The authors found that SARS-CoV-2 infects the upper respiratory tracts of ferrets but is poorly transmissible between individuals. In cats, the virus replicated in the nose and throat and caused inflammatory pathology deeper in the respiratory tract, and airborne transmission did occur between pairs of cats. Dogs appeared not to support viral replication well and had low susceptibility to the virus, and pigs, chickens, and ducks were not susceptible to SARS-CoV-2. Science , this issue p. 1016 ; see also p. 942

Animal influenza viruses continue to pose a threat to human public health. The Eurasian avian-like H1N1 (EA H1N1) viruses are widespread in pigs throughout Europe and China and have caused human infections in several countries, indicating their pandemic potential. To carefully monitor the evolution of the EA H1N1 viruses in nature, we collected nasal swabs from 103,110 pigs in 22 provinces in China between October 2013 and December 2019, and isolated 855 EA H1N1 viruses. Genomic analysis of 319 representative viruses revealed that these EA H1N1 viruses formed eight different genotypes through reassortment with viruses of other lineages circulating in humans and pigs, and two of these genotypes (G4 and G5) were widely distributed in pigs. Animal studies indicated that some strains have become highly pathogenic in mice and highly transmissible in ferrets via respiratory droplets. Moreover, two-thirds of the EA H1N1 viruses reacted poorly with ferret serum antibodies induced by the currently used H1N1 human influenza vaccine, suggesting that existing immunity may not prevent the transmission of the EA H1N1 viruses in humans. Our study reveals the evolution and pandemic potential of EA H1N1 viruses and provides important insights for future pandemic preparedness.

The antigenic relationship between Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine influenza viruses (EA H1N1) and human pandemic 2009 H1N1 viruses (2009/H1N1) remains a critical question for influenza surveillance and vaccine efficacy. This study systematically investigated the antigenic differences between strains A/swine/Tianjin/312/2016 (TJ312, EA H1N1) and A/Guangdong-Maonan/SWL1536/2019 (GD1536, 2009/H1N1). Cross-hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays revealed a significant antigenic disparity, with a 16-fold reduction in heterologous versus homologous HI titers. Comparative sequence analysis identified 22 amino acid differences across the five major antigenic sites (Sa, Sb, Ca1, Ca2, and Cb) of the HA1 subunit. Using reverse genetics, a panel of mutant viruses was generated. This study revealed that a single histidine (H)-to-asparagine (N) substitution at residue 128 (H3 numbering) in the Sa antigenic site acts as a primary determinant of antigenic variation, sufficient to cause a four-fold change in HI titers and a measurable drift in antigenic distance. Structural modeling via AlphaFold3 and PyMOL software suggests that the H128N mutation may alter the local conformation of the antigenic site. It is plausible that H at position 128 could exert electrostatic repulsion with adjacent amino acids, whereas N might facilitate hydrogen bond formation with neighboring residues. These interactions would potentially lead to structural changes in the antigenic site. Our findings confirm that residue 128 is a critical molecular marker for the antigenic differentiation of EA H1N1 and 2009/H1N1 viruses. The study underscores the necessity of monitoring specific HA mutations that could reduce cross-reactivity and provides valuable insights for refining vaccine strain selection and pandemic preparedness strategies.

The antigenic relationship between Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine influenza viruses (EA H1N1) and human pandemic 2009 H1N1 viruses (2009/H1N1) remains a critical question for influenza surveillance and vaccine efficacy. This study systematically investigated the antigenic differences between strains A/swine/Tianjin/312/2016 (TJ312, EA H1N1) and A/Guangdong-Maonan/SWL1536/2019 (GD1536, 2009/H1N1). Cross-hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays revealed a significant antigenic disparity, with a 16-fold reduction in heterologous versus homologous HI titers. Comparative sequence analysis identified 22 amino acid differences across the five major antigenic sites (Sa, Sb, Ca1, Ca2, Cb) of the HA1 subunit. Using reverse genetics, a panel of mutant viruses was generated. This study revealed that a single histidine (H)-to-asparagine (N) substitution at residue 128 (H3 numbering) in the Sa antigenic site acts as a primary determinant of antigenic variation, sufficient to cause a 4-fold change in HI titers and a measurable shift in antigenic distance. Structural modeling via AlphaFold3 and PyMOL software reveals that the H128N mutation alters the local conformation of the antigenic site, by which H at position 128 exerts electrostatic repulsion with adjacent amino acids, while N facilitates hydrogen bond formation with adjacent amino acids, ultimately leading to changes in the protein structure of the antigenic site. Our findings confirm that residue 128 is a critical molecular marker for the antigenic differentiation of EA H1N1 and 2009/H1N1 viruses. The study underscores the necessity of monitoring specific HA mutations that could reduce cross-reactivity and provides valuable insights for refining vaccine strain selection and pandemic preparedness strategies.