Dian Liu

Dr. Dian Liu


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 November 2016 in Knowledge-Based Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DLDian Liu
Dian Liu
HWHongwei Wang
Hongwei Wang
CQChao Qi
Chao Qi
PZPeng Zhao
Peng Zhao
JWJian Wang
Jian Wang

1 November 2015 in Gene
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YLYing-Li Liu
Ying-Li Liu
JZJie Zheng
Jie Zheng
LTLi-Juan Tang
Li-Juan Tang
WHWei Han
Wei Han
JWJian-Min Wang
Jian-Min Wang
QTQing-Bao Tian
Qing-Bao Tian

5 August 2020
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
YZYu Zeng
Yu Zeng
YQYong Qin
Yong Qin
DLDian Liu
Dian Liu
YFYong Fu
Yong Fu
MGMing Gong
Ming Gong
XZXinning Zhang
Xinning Zhang
The safe operation of railway train is very important to the safety of the railway system. Therefore, it is necessary to master the failure rules and causes of the railway train devices. However, the current common fault analysis methods have some shortcomings, such as complicated compilation process and insufficient expression. Therefore, we choose to use the knowledge graph technology. Firstly, the common faults of railway train devices are obtained through the statistics of real fault data; secondly, the causes of faults are analyzed and the fault tree is established; thirdly, the ontology of railway train system is modeled according to the idea of fault tree construction; finally, the logical relationship between ontology is established according to the ontology model, and the railway train device fault causality model based on knowledge graph is established.

9 September 2024 in Electronic Commerce Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
DLDian Liu
Dian Liu
WZWenshuang Zhao
Wenshuang Zhao
Vijayan SugumaranVijayan Sugumaran
Vijayan Sugumaran
JZJing Zhang
Jing Zhang

6 February 2024 in JOURNAL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HLHui Lu
Hui Lu
DLDian Liu
Dian Liu
JLJue Li
Jue Li
Supply chain management plays a pivotal role in the smooth execution of prefabricated construction. One key aspect involves strategically placing and sizing buffers to handle uncertainties (e.g., stochastic material lead-times and activity durations) within the prefabricated construction supply chain (PCSC). This study examines three buffering policies based on varying combinations of time and inventory buffers to mitigate stochastic material delays and activity prolongs in PSCS, namely, pure inventory buffering policy, pure time buffering policy, and mixed inventory-time buffering policy. To enable this analysis, we characterize how stochastic material delays originating from off-site supply chains impact project schedules, and then develop mathematical procedures for sizing inventory and/or time buffers under the three buffering policies. Case application and numerical analysis are conducted to investigate the performance of these buffering policies and the impact of the project characteristics on them (e.g., due date and arrival rate). Finally, insights are extracted to assist managers in choosing appropriate policies for projects with different characteristics. In general, combining inventory and time buffers results in better performance, particularly under tight project deadlines and high arrival rates. The pure time buffering policy can also be a viable option in specific situations, allowing managers to have more choices.

14 July 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
HLHui Lu
Hui Lu
HWHongwei Wang
Hongwei Wang
CQChao Qi
Chao Qi
YXYong Xie
Yong Xie
DLDian Liu
Dian Liu
In construction projects, a centralized management mode can effectively address the material management issues. Specifically, the Material Management Department (MMD) is responsible for material purchase, storage, and allocation based on the demand information reported by contractors. However, material demand are best observed by the contractors. They may manipulate the material takeoff (i.e. misrepresent the material demand) to increase the expected material allocation and avoid the project delay. Motivated by this situation, this paper focuses on the incentives to elicit truthful reporting from contractors. Cases of having prior information and no prior information about the material takeoff, as well as priority allocation and proportional allocation policies are considered. Under the case of having prior information, an incentive scheme is designed based on the Groves payment rule, while under the case of no prior information, two incentive schemes are designed based on the proper scoring rules. The comparison and numerical analysis show that the total three incentive schemes can induce the MMD to choose a system-optimal inventory plan, as well as satisfy the participation constraints of contractors. Besides, the results also demonstrate that prior information is only the prerequisite for implementing the Groves incentive scheme and cannot improve the performance of the whole system in other aspects.