For more than 20 years, Deidre McCloskey has campaigned to convince the economics profession that it is hopelessly confused about statistical significance. She argues that many practices associated with significance testing are bad science and that most economists routinely employ these bad practices: ‘Though to a child they look like science, with all that really hard math, no science is being done in these and 96 percent of the best empirical economics …’ (McCloskey 1999 McCloskey, D. N. 1999. “Other Things Equal: Cassandra's Open Letter to Her Economist Colleagues,”. Eastern Economic Journal, 25(3): 357–363. [Google Scholar] ). McCloskey's charges are analyzed and rejected. That statistical significance is not economic significance is a jejune and uncontroversial claim, and there is no convincing evidence that economists systematically mistake the two. Other elements of McCloskey's analysis of statistical significance are shown to be ill‐founded, and her criticisms of practices of economists are found to be based in inaccurate readings and tendentious interpretations of those economists' work. Properly used, significance tests are a valuable tool for assessing signal strength, for assisting in model specification, and for determining causal structure.
The dominant view among macroeconomists is that macroeconomics reduces to microeconomics, both in the sense that all macroeconomic phenomena arise out of microeconomic phenomena and in the sense that macroeconomic theory—to the extent that it is correct—can be derived from microeconomic theory. More than that, the dominant view believes that macroeconomics should in practice use the reduced microeconomic theory: this is the program of microfoundations for macroeconomics to which the vast majority of macroeconomists adhere. The “microfoundational” models that they actually employ are, however, characterized by another feature: they are highly idealized, even when they are applied as direct characterizations of actual data, which itself consists of macroeconomic aggregates. This paper explores the interrelationship between reductionism and idealization in the microfoundational program and the role of idealization in empirical modeling.
20 July 2008 in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
The paper provides a careful, analytical account of Trygve Haavelmo’s use of the analogy between controlled experiments common in the natural sciences and econometric techniques. The experimental analogy forms the linchpin of the methodology for passive observation that he develops in his famous monograph, The Probability Approach in Econometrics (1944). Contrary to some recent interpretations of Haavelmo’s method, the experimental analogy does not commit Haavelmo to a strong apriorism in which econometrics can only test and reject theoretical hypotheses, rather it supports the acquisition of knowledge through a two-way exchange between theory and empirical evidence. Once the details of the analogy are systematically understood, the experimental analogy can be used to shed light on theory-consistent cointegrated vector autoregression (CVAR) scenario analyses. A CVAR scenario analysis can be interpreted as a clear example of Haavelmo’s ‘experimental’ approach; and, in turn, it can be shown to extend and develop Haavelmo’s methodology and to address issues that Haavelmo regarded as unresolved.