In this paper, we investigate economic performance and environmental performance of a dual-channel green supply chain (GSC). Given that most relevant literature still focus on the descriptive aspect of GSC, we adopt game theoretic approach rather than qualitative analysis method to address the following problems: (1) How can the integration of environmental and economic sustainability goals be achieved in GSC? (2) What is the impact of customer environmental awareness on the green level and profitability of the GSC? (3) How does the market demand changes in the presence of the online direct channel in addition to the traditional one? We establish four game models, which are decentralized scenario, centralized scenario, retailer-led revenue-sharing scenario and bargaining revenue-sharing scenario. In the decentralized scenario, participants in a GSC make individual decisions based on their specific interests. In the centralized scenario, the GSC is regarded as a whole and the participants make collective decisions to maximize the overall profit of the GSC. In addition, in the two revenue-sharing scenarios, revenue-sharing contracts as the important profit coordination systems are set up and the revenue-sharing ratio is determined either by the retailer or through bargaining. Moreover, the cost of green product research and development, customer environmental awareness and price sensitivity are also taken into account in the four scenarios. By comparing and analyzing the four game models, we recommend the two revenue-sharing scenarios as the optimum choice and improving green awareness as a feasible strategy to achieve the integration of economic and environmental goals of the GSC. Additionally, we find that online sales has become a major distribution channel of the GSC.
Since financing issues of research and development (R&D) directly determine the success of green supply chain initiatives, the choice of funding mechanisms becomes key for green supply chain participants. However, there are few quantitative studies on the financing issues of green supply chains. We study green R&D financing issues for a two-echelon green supply chain, in which a green manufacturer and a regular manufacturer produce and sell green and regular products to a retailer, respectively. External and internal funding mechanisms as well as consumer green loyalty are considered in this study, which encourages green manufacturers to produce environment-friendly products. Three game models, namely, a partially centralized system, government subsidy, and two-part tariff contract scenarios, are formulated to investigate green R&D financing issues. The analytical results show that: (a) Government subsidies cannot effectively promote green manufacturers to improve the greenness of products if the amount of the government subsidy does not exceed a threshold. (b) Under government subsidy schemes, with an increase in subsidies, the output of green products first reaches the level under the partially centralized system, followed by the greenness of products. (c) The two-part tariff contract with a reasonable fixed fee can effectively coordinate retailers and green manufacturers to achieve cooperation, in which the greenness level of products and the retail price are equal to the values under the partially centralized system. (d) Retailers and green manufacturers have different preferences of financing modes; two-part tariff contracts are favored by retailers, while government subsidies are preferred by green manufacturers.
The Dynamic Interval (DI) graph models the updating uncertainty of the arc cost in the graph, which shows great application prospects in unstable-road transportation planning and management. This paper studies the Real-time Shortest Path (RTSP) problems in the DI graph. First, the RTSP problem is defined in mathematical equations. Second, three models for RTSP are proposed, which are the Dynamic Robust Shortest Path (DRSP) model, the Dynamic Greedy Robust Shortest Path (DGRSP) model and the Dynamic Mean Shortest Path (DMSP) model. Then, three solution methods are designed. Finally, a numerical study is conducted to compare the efficiency of the models and corresponding solution methods. It shows that the DGRSP model and DMSP model generally present better results than the others. In the real road network test, they have the minimum average-regret-ratio of DGSP 7.8% and DMSP 7.1%; while in the generated network test, they both have a minimum average-regret-ratio of 0.5%.