Quantum algorithms are raising concerns in the field of cryptography all over the world. A growing number of symmetric cryptography algorithms have been attacked in the quantum setting. Type-3 generalized Feistel scheme (GFS) and unbalanced Feistel scheme with expanding functions (UFS-E) are common symmetric cryptography schemes, which are often used in cryptographic analysis and design. We propose quantum distinguishing attacks on Type-3 GFS and UFS-E in the quantum chosen plaintext attack setting. The results of key recovery are better than those based on exhaustive search in the quantum setting.
14 January 2024 in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
Industrial Internet plays an important role in key critical infrastructure sectors and is the target of different security threats and risks. There are limitations in many existing attack detection approaches, such as function redundancy, overfitting, and low efficiency. A combinatorial optimization method—Lagrange multiplier—is designed to optimize the underlying feature screening algorithm. The optimized feature combination is fused with random forest and XG-Boost selected features to improve the accuracy and efficiency of attack feature analysis. Using both the UNSW-NB15 and natural gas pipeline datasets, we evaluate the performance of the proposed method. It is observed that the influence degrees of the different features associated with the attack behavior can result in the binary classification attack detection increasing to 0.93 and the attack detection time reducing by 6.96 times. The overall accuracy of multi-classification attack detection is also observed to improve by 0.11. We also observe that nine key features of attack behavior analysis are essential to the analysis and detection of general attacks targeting the system, and by focusing on these features one could potentially improve the effectiveness and efficiency of real-time critical industrial system security. In this article, the CICDDoS2019 and CICIDS2018 datasets are used to prove the generalization. The experimental results show that the proposed method has good generalization and can be extended to the same type of industrial anomaly datasets.
17 September 2024 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
GIFT, as a lightweight block cipher algorithm, is mainly suitable for resource-constrained environments, such as the Internet of Things, to achieve efficient cryptographic communication. For the diffusion characteristics of round function of GIFT algorithm, this paper proposes two byte-based differential fault attack models. Theoretically, the first and second models require 53.44 and 12.42 byte faults to recover the master key. Experimental results show that the first and second models require about 79 and 16 byte faults, respectively, to recover the master key. The models proposed in this paper have made significant breakthroughs in terms of both the attack range and the number of required faults, which provide important guidance for algorithmic security research and the design of fault-tolerant mechanisms for IoT devices.
Feistel schemes are important components of symmetric ciphers, which have been extensively studied in the classical setting. We examine the extension methods of differential distinguishers of Feistel key-function and Feistel function-key schemes. The schemes are subjected to quantum differential collision distinguishing attacks based on the methods. The results show that the complexity is lower than that of differential attacks using only Grover algorithm, and the complexity of differential collision attack based on the Brassard-Høyer-Tapp and Grover algorithms is lower than that of quantization when using only the Grover algorithm. The results also show that different algorithms and methods can be combined to produce a more effective cryptanalysis approach. This provides a research direction for post-quantum cryptographic analysis and design.
The deep convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) exposes Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) systems to complex cross-layer attacks. However, traditional defense methods are mostly designed for a single domain and rely on static or rule-based mechanisms, making them ineffective in capturing cross-layer attack evolution and coordinating adaptive responses. Therefore, this article proposes a Situation-Based Hierarchical Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (Situ-HMARL) adaptive defense framework, which formulates defense strategies based on real-time global industrial situations and proactively enhances the resilience of IIoT systems. Firstly, a three-stage industrial situational awareness architecture is proposed to continuously fuse heterogeneous data from the IT and OT layers into a structured Global Industrial Situation Vector (GISV), which serves as a unified global observation space for defense decision-making. Secondly, a lightweight Moving Target Defense (MTD) mechanism is designed to adaptively trigger IP-hopping based on the global industrial situation, thereby reducing overhead while preserving system availability. On this basis, a two-level Hierarchical Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (HMARL) framework is developed to decouple perception, decision-making, and enforcement. Low-level agents perform real-time local situational perception and execute defense actions, while a high-level agent reasons over the global industrial situation to generate coordinated defense strategies that minimize system losses. Extensive experiments conducted on the Cyber Operations Research Gym (CybORG) platform validate that the proposed framework effectively mitigates cross-layer attacks and significantly improves the availability of IIoT systems.