As cyber threats have increased in both frequency and complexity, the European Union (EU) has taken measures to enhance its cybersecurity framework. This has included the implementation of directives such as NIS1 and NIS2, as well as the establishment of databases such as the European Repository of Cyber Incidents (EuRepoC) and the Cyber Events Database from the University of Maryland. This research investigates the relationships between different types of cyber actors and the corresponding incidents, as well as the correlation between industry sectors and types of cyber incidents. Utilizing chi-square testing on a dataset comprising over 14,000 cyberattack incidents, we identified statistically significant correlations that substantiate the hypotheses proposed. The results of the study indicated that specific actor types, such as nation-states and criminals, were more likely to be associated with particular incident types. In contrast, industry sectors like healthcare and public administration exhibited distinct vulnerabilities. The findings underscore the imperative for data-driven and sector-specific cybersecurity policies within the EU, underscoring the role of comprehensive data repositories in informing effective governance against cyber threats. It is imperative that member states continue to collaborate in order to leverage these insights and enhance resilience and safeguard critical services across Europe.

This study examines the various motivations that drive cyberattacks, focusing on correlations with the types of actors and the types of events they execute. The rise of digitization, especially post-COVID-19, has intensified the threat landscape, making it critical to understand the factors influencing these attacks. Using the University of Maryland's Cyber Events Database (2014-2024), the research uses chi-squared tests to identify significant correlations between different actor categories-such as cybercriminals, state-sponsored entities, and activist groups-and their motivations, which include financial gain, espionage, protest, and sabotage. The results indicate that ideology-driven actors often engage in disruptive events, while cybercriminals focus primarily on exploitative actions aimed at economic gain. These findings underscore the urgent need for multifaceted cybersecurity strategies that adapt to changing dynamics in the threat landscape, foster cross-sector collaboration, and support informed policymaking to strengthen defenses against diverse cyber risks. The study lays the groundwork for future research into the linkages between actor motivations and their operational impacts, thereby contributing to improved cybersecurity practices and resilience.