Qingkai Ji

Dr. Qingkai Ji


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2020 in Applied Mathematical Modelling
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
QJQingkai Ji
Qingkai Ji
SZShaorui Zhou
Shaorui Zhou
BLBo Li
Bo Li
ZCZhiming Chen
Zhiming Chen

1 January 2014 in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
QWQian Wang
Qian Wang
QJQingkai Ji
Qingkai Ji
CCChun-Hung Chiu
Chun-Hung Chiu
We present a metaheuristic called the reactive guided tabu search (RGTS) to solve the heterogeneous fleet multicompartment vehicle routing problem (MCVRP), where a single vehicle is required for cotransporting multiple customer orders. MCVRP is commonly found in delivery of fashion apparel, petroleum distribution, food distribution, and waste collection. In searching the optimum solution of MCVRP, we need to handle a large amount of local optima in the solution spaces. To overcome this problem, we design three guiding mechanisms in which the search history is used to guide the search. The three mechanisms are experimentally demonstrated to be more efficient than the ones which only apply the known distance information. Armed with the guiding mechanisms and the well‐known reactive mechanism, the RGTS can produce remarkable solutions in a reasonable computation time.

15 December 2014 in International Journal of Production Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
QJQingkai Ji
Qingkai Ji
LSLijun Sun
Lijun Sun
XHXiangpei Hu
Xiangpei Hu
JHJing Hou
Jing Hou
We study optimal policies of capacitated two-echelon serial inventory systems under periodic review. For a system with smaller downstream capacity, we fully characterise the optimal policy as a further modified echelon base stock policy using an intuitive backward induction. The key lies in the magnitude relation between the initial upstream stock level and the downstream capacity. For a system with smaller upstream capacity, we demonstrate that the optimal policy is of a more complex structure where there can be at most four/five target levels up to which the upstream/downstream echelon tries to produce/order. The numbers of levels and their values depend on the length of remaining horizons and the amount of initial upstream inventories. We also specify these potential target levels and then suggest a way to simplify the search of optimal solutions.

18 February 2022 in Managerial and Decision Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YGYing Gao
Ying Gao
XHXiangpei Hu
Xiangpei Hu
QJQingkai Ji
Qingkai Ji

23 December 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GFGang Fang
Gang Fang
QJQingkai Ji
Qingkai Ji
XHXiangpei Hu
Xiangpei Hu
To enhance competitiveness and curb sourcing costs, many manufacturers now turn to investments in independent R&D of core components (e.g., chips for smartphones or batteries for electrical vehicles). However, R&D is expensive, lengthy and inherently uncertain. Knowing that R&D success is not guaranteed, should manufacturers abandon the supplier and turn to in-house production (the Abandon policy) or maintain the supplier as a complementary source (the Retain policy)? We model this situation as a two-stage game, derive equilibrium solutions under both policies, and identify the manufacturer's optimal strategy under convex production costs. Our results reveal interesting managerial insights. The Retain policy always provides sourcing cost relief to the manufacturer, a benefit absent under the Abandon policy. An increase in the manufacturer's technology level can always benefit the manufacturer under the Abandon policy, which is not the case under the Retain policy. A counter-intuitive finding is that an increase in supplier's cost may possibly benefit all supply chain members under the Retain policy. Furthermore, we provide guidance on policy choices that the manufacturer with a sufficiently high level of technology should adopt the Abandon policy. Conversely, the manufacturer with a low level of technology should adopt the Retain Policy. Finally, we find that the timing of supplier pricing and linear in-house production costs do not affect the main conclusions, but the manufacturer consistently prefers the Abandon policy under concave costs.

14 October 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
GLGuangmei Lyu
Guangmei Lyu
QJQingkai Ji
Qingkai Ji
GZGuoqing Zhang
Guoqing Zhang
Fresh agricultural product suppliers face severe financial constraints due to long production cycles, seasonality, and product perishability, which result in tight cash flows and limited financing options. This paper develops a three-tier supply chain game-theoretic model involving suppliers, retailers, and third-party logistics (3PL) providers. The model examines suppliers' optimal financing strategies under dual financing needs—pre-delivery financing (bank loans, retailer prepayments, and 3PL financing) and post-delivery financing (factoring)—and investigates how blockchain-based smart contracts affect supply chain efficiency and their applicability boundaries. The results reveal three key findings. First, under traditional financing modes, 3PL financing reduces the commitment friction zone, while buyer direct financing (BDF) eliminates it entirely. High-risk suppliers are better suited to bank financing, low-risk suppliers benefit more from 3PL financing, and BDF proves most advantageous for suppliers with medium liquidity risk. Second, smart contracts generate both commitment and credit gains under bank and 3PL financing, but only credit gains under BDF. Third, smart contract adoption is not universally beneficial; under low-risk conditions, they may erode 3PL profits and reduce overall supply chain performance. This study makes three contributions. It develops a novel three-tier supply chain framework incorporating both pre- and post-delivery financing interactions; it identifies the differentiated effects of smart contracts across financing structures; and it emphasizes that smart contracts are not a “one-size-fits-all” solution. These findings provide new theoretical insights and practical guidance for the design of financing strategies and blockchain-based smart contracts in fresh agricultural supply chains.