Xuebo Qiu

Dr. Xuebo Qiu

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MLMingqi Lv
Mingqi Lv
HGHongzhe Gao
Hongzhe Gao
XQXuebo Qiu
Xuebo Qiu
TCTieming Chen
Tieming Chen
TZTiantian Zhu
Tiantian Zhu
SJShouling Ji
Shouling Ji
APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) with the characteristics of persistence, stealth, and diversity is one of the greatest threats against cyber-infrastructure. As a countermeasure, existing studies leverage provenance graphs to capture the complex relations between system entities in a host for effective APT detection. In addition to detecting single attack events as most existing work does, understanding the tactics / techniques (e.g., Kill-Chain, ATT&CK) applied to organize and accomplish the APT attack campaign is also important for security operations. Existing studies try to manually design a set of rules to map low-level system events to high-level APT tactics / techniques. However, the rule based methods are coarse-grained and lack generalization ability. Thus, they can only recognize APT tactics and have difficulty in identifying APT techniques. They also cannot adapt to mutant behaviors of existing APT tactics / techniques. In this paper, we propose TREC, the first attempt to recognize APT tactics / techniques from provenance graphs by exploiting deep learning techniques. To address the "needle in a haystack" problem, TREC segments small and compact subgraphs covering individual APT technique instances from a large provenance graph based on a malicious node detection model and a subgraph sampling algorithm. To address the "training sample scarcity" problem, TREC trains the APT tactic / technique recognition model in a few-shot learning manner by adopting a Siamese neural network. We evaluate TREC based on a customized dataset collected and made public by our team. The experiment results show that TREC significantly outperforms state-of-the-art systems in APT tactic recognition and TREC can also effectively identify APT techniques.

5 December 2024 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TCTieming Chen
Tieming Chen
QSQijie Song
Qijie Song
TZTiantian Zhu
Tiantian Zhu
XQXuebo Qiu
Xuebo Qiu
ZZZhiling Zhu
Zhiling Zhu
MLMingqi Lv
Mingqi Lv

23 May 2025 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
QSQijie Song
Qijie Song
TCTieming Chen
Tieming Chen
TZTiantian Zhu
Tiantian Zhu
MLMingqi Lv
Mingqi Lv
XQXuebo Qiu
Xuebo Qiu
ZZZhiling Zhu
Zhiling Zhu
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) challenge cybersecurity due to their stealthy, multi-stage nature. For the provenance graph based on fine-grained kernel logs, existing methods have difficulty distinguishing behavior boundaries and handling complex multi-entity dependencies, which exhibit high false positives in dynamic environments. To address this, we propose a Hypergraph Attention Network framework for APT detection. First, we employ anomaly node detection on provenance graphs constructed from kernel logs to select seed nodes, which serve as starting points for discovering overlapping behavioral communities via node aggregation. These communities are then encoded as hyperedges to construct a hypergraph that captures high-order interactions. By integrating hypergraph structural semantics with nodes and hyperedge dual attention mechanisms, our framework achieves robust APT detection by modeling complex behavioral dependencies. Experiments on DARPA and Unicorn show superior performance: 97.73% accuracy, 98.35% F1-score, and a 0.12% FPR. By bridging hypergraph theory and adaptive attention, the framework effectively models complex attack semantics, offering a robust solution for real-time APT detection.


30 December 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XQXuebo Qiu
Xuebo Qiu
MLMingqi Lv
Mingqi Lv
TCTieming Chen
Tieming Chen
TZTiantian Zhu
Tiantian Zhu
QSQijie Song
Qijie Song
ZZZhiling Zhu
Zhiling Zhu
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) commonly manifest through a sequence of attack steps, known as Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). Recent studies identify TTPs by converting audit logs into causal provenance graphs and applying expert-driven mappings that correlate low-level system events with high-level TTP patterns. However, these methods face persistent challenges: determining the impact boundaries of TTP activities, adapting to evolving TTP stacks, and recognizing fine-grained TTP semantics for deeper forensic insights. To address these challenges, we present Zoomer, a novel TTP recognition framework that segments provenance graphs into multiple TTP subgraphs with multi-granular annotations (i.e., tactics, techniques, and sub-techniques). First, we devise a heuristic subgraph sampling algorithm guided by anomalous node detection to precisely delineate the scope of TTP activities. Second, we introduce a dual-tower Deep & Wide architecture that integrates contextual behavior semantics from provenance graphs and domain-informed features to learn expressive TTP representations. Finally, we adopt a prototypical network that reformulates TTP recognition as a few-shot pattern matching task, thereby enhancing adaptability and accuracy under limited supervision. To advance future research, we built and released the first TTP-annotated provenance dataset, encompassing the most comprehensive collection of TTP instances to date. Extensive experiments show that Zoomer achieves TTP recognition with 88% accuracy at the sub-technique level and 94% at the tactic level, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art baselines.

20 April 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
XQXuebo Qiu
Xuebo Qiu
MLMingqi Lv
Mingqi Lv
YZYimei Zhang
Yimei Zhang
TCTieming Chen
Tieming Chen
TZTiantian Zhu
Tiantian Zhu
SJShouling Ji
Shouling Ji
Provenance-based threat hunting identifies Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) on endpoints by correlating attack patterns described in Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) with provenance graphs derived from system audit logs. A fundamental challenge in this paradigm lies in the modality gap —the structural and semantic disconnect between provenance graphs and CTI reports. Prior work addresses this by framing threat hunting as a graph matching task: 1) extracting attack graphs from CTI reports, and 2) aligning them with provenance graphs. However, this pipeline incurs severe information loss during graph extraction and demands intensive manual curation, undermining scalability and effectiveness. In this paper, we present APT-CGLP , a novel cross-modal APT hunting system via Contrastive Graph-Language Pre-training, facilitating end-to-end semantic matching between provenance graphs and CTI reports without human intervention. First, empowered by the Large Language Model (LLM), APT-CGLP mitigates data scarcity by synthesizing high-fidelity provenance graph-CTI report pairs, while simultaneously distilling actionable insights from noisy web-sourced CTIs to improve their operational utility. Second, APT-CGLP incorporates a tailored multi-objective training algorithm that synergizes contrastive learning with inter-modal masked modeling, promoting cross-modal attack semantic alignment at both coarse- and fine-grained levels. Extensive experiments on four real-world APT datasets demonstrate that APT-CGLP consistently outperforms state-of-the-art threat hunting baselines in terms of accuracy and efficiency.