Strategies adopted by individuals in a social network significantly impact the network, and they strongly affect relationships between individuals in the network. Links between individuals also heavily influence their levels of cooperation. Taking into account the evolution of each individual’s connection, we explore how sensitivity and visibility affect the prisoner’s dilemma game. The so-called ‘sensitivity’ and ‘visibility’ respectively present one’s self-protection consciousness and the ability of gaining information. We find that at moderate levels of player sensitivity cooperative behavior increases, but that at high levels it is inhibited. We also find that the heterogeneity of the weight of individuals at the end of the game is higher when sensitivity and visibility are increased, but that the successful-defection-payoff has less impact on the weight of individuals and on the relationship between the heterogeneity of the weight of individuals and the density of cooperators. This framework can be used to clarify the interaction mechanism between the micro-level of individual behavior and the macro-level of individual co-evolutionary processes.
7 January 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
Since human face-to-face communications change over time, their perceived probabilities associated with uncertain outcomes usually present a nonlinear fashion in reality. This article incorporates both humans active characteristics and risk perception into epidemic spreading and explores a comprehensive evolutionary vaccination game in activity-driven networks. According to the weighting effect, the individuals' activity rate thresholds are obtained in different cases under the framework of the pure Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, how the number of connected edges of activated individuals m and infection rate λ affect individuals' vaccination, decision-making is theoretically analyzed. It is proven that some unvaccinated individuals gradually become vaccinated individuals with the increase of m or λ. Moreover, there is a unique pure Nash equilibrium social state (Pareto optimization), and the pure Nash equilibrium together with Pareto optimization has the same equilibrium for our proposed evolutionary vaccination game, which provides an alternative condition judging the stability of game system. In the case of complete information and individual complete rationality, the factors, including vaccination cost, individuals' activity rate, the number of connected edges of activated individuals, and infection rate, have a significant influence on the final average social cost.
1 January 2023 in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
Social interactions have become more complicated and changeable under the influence of information technology revolution. We, thereby, propose a multi-layer activity-driven network with attractiveness considering the heterogeneity of activated individual edge numbers, which aims to explore the role of heterogeneous behaviors in the time-varying network. Specifically, three types of individual behaviors are introduced: (i) self-quarantine of infected individuals, (ii) safe social distancing between infected and susceptible individuals, and (iii) information spreading of aware individuals. Epidemic threshold is theoretically derived in terms of the microscopic Markov chain approach and the mean-field approach. The results demonstrate that performing self-quarantine and maintaining safe social distance can effectively raise the epidemic threshold and suppress the spread of diseases. Interestingly, individuals’ activity and individuals’ attractiveness have an equivalent effect on epidemic threshold under the same condition. In addition, a similar result can be obtained regardless of the activated individual edge numbers. The epidemic outbreak earlier in a situation of the stronger heterogeneity of activated individual edge numbers.
This work sheds important light on how the initial level of visibility and limited resource might affect the evolution of the players’ strategies under different network structure. We perform the prisoner’s dilemma game in the lattice network and the scale-free network, the simulation results indicate that the average density of death in lattice network decreases with the increases of the initial proportion of visibility. However, the contrary phenomenon is observed in the scale-free network. Further results reflect that the individuals’ payoff in lattice network is significantly larger than the one in the scale-free network. In the lattice network, the visibility individuals could earn much more than the invisibility one. However, the difference is not apparent in the scale-free network. We also find that a high Successful-Defection-Payoff (SDB) and a rich natural environment have relatively larger deleterious cooperation effects. A high SDB is beneficial to raising the level of visibility in the heterogeneous network, however, that has adverse visibility consequences in homogeneous network. Our result reveals that players are more likely to cooperate voluntarily under homogeneous network structure.