Karl Neill Fleming

Mr. Karl Neill Fleming

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 September 2025 in Journal of Nuclear Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
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KFKarl Neill Fleming
Karl Neill Fleming
BLBengt O. Y. Lydell
Bengt O. Y. Lydell
MPMary Presley
Mary Presley
AMAli Mosleh
Ali Mosleh
WCWadie Chalgham
Wadie Chalgham
Utilities that operate nuclear power plants are increasingly using probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) to make day-to-day decisions on design, operations, and maintenance and to support risk-informed applications. These applications require high-quality and complete PRAs to ensure that the decisions and proposed changes are technically well-founded. Such PRAs include the modeling and quantification of PRA models for accident sequences initiated by internal floods and high-energy line breaks. To support PRA updates and upgrades for such sequences, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has sponsored ongoing research to develop and refine guidance and generic data that can be used to estimate initiating event frequencies for internal flood- and high-energy line break-induced accident sequences. In 2023, EPRI published the fifth revision of a generic database for these initiating event frequencies. This revision produced advancements in the methodology for passive component reliability, including the quantification of aging effects on pipe rupture frequencies and the capability to adjust these frequencies to account for enhancements to integrity management strategies associated with leak inspections and non-destructive examinations. The purpose of this paper is to present these enhancements and illustrate their application with selected examples.

1 December 2009
Verified
Report
Open access
PDF file
EWEdward G. Wallace
Edward G. Wallace
KFKarl Neill Fleming
Karl Neill Fleming
EBEdward M. Burns
Edward M. Burns
The purpose of this paper is to (1) document the definition of defense-in-depth and the pproach that will be used to assure that its principles are satisfied for the NGNP project and (2) identify the specific questions proposed for preapplication discussions with the NRC. Defense-in-depth is a safety philosophy in which multiple lines of defense and conservative design and evaluation methods are applied to assure the safety of the public. The philosophy is also intended to deliver a design that is tolerant to uncertainties in knowledge of plant behavior, component reliability or operator performance that might compromise safety. This paper includes a review of the regulatory foundation for defense-in-depth, a definition of defense-in-depth that is appropriate for advanced reactor designs based on High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) technology, and an explanation of how this safety philosophy is achieved in the NGNP.